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BINDING ARBITRATION AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE UNDER
THE FAA: WILL THIS MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE SURVIVE?
By Kenneth F. Dunham, J.D., LL.M, Associate Professor of Law
ADR Director

Faulkner University’s Thomas Goode Jones School of Law
INTRODUCTION:
A homeowner purchased a condominium at an auction and encountered
numerous problems. The homeowner’s problems with the auction company
could not be resolved, and the homeowner sued the auction company for
negligence and fraud. The auction company moved the court to stay the
lawsuit and compel arbitration under an agreement between the auction
company and the condominium homeowner’s association.1 A car buyer
brought a lawsuit against a car dealer for suppression and misrepresentation.
The sales contract contained an arbitration agreement, and the car dealer
moved the court to compel arbitration.2 A Delaware general contractor
subcontracted a roofing project to a Tennessee roofing contractor for a
project in Alabama. When a problem with payment arose, the general
contractor sued the owner of the property where the work was performed,
and the owner moved the court to compel arbitration.3 A few decades ago
arbitration agreements were common in construction contracts, labor
1
2
3

National Auction Group, Inc. v. Hammett, 854 So. 2d 65 (2003).
Parkway Dodge v. Hawkins, 854 So. 2d 1129 (2003).
Huntsville Utilities v. Consolidated Construction Company, 2003 WL 21 205396.
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contracts and in some commercial sales contracts,4 but it seems they are
appearing everywhere these days.
Arbitration is one of a group of conflict resolution processes known as
alternative dispute resolution, or ADR. The word “alternative” connotes
they are used as alternatives to the public dispute resolution forum known as
the court system. Although some would argue there is little need for
alternatives to the public justice system, and that some of these alternatives
might actually be harmful, their utilization has increased dramatically in the
past three decades.5 The use of ADR has been blamed on the litigation
explosion, although some scholars have questioned the extent and intensity
of the “explosion”.6 Although there is evidence to suggest lawsuit filings
have increased dramatically since the 1960’s, the use of ADR processes may
be more reflective of dissatisfaction with the court system than a litigation
“explosion.”
The American legal system is a good system, but it is far from perfect.
The U.S. court system is neither cost efficient nor time efficient. Each
4

5

6

Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Company, 460 U.S. 1 (1983) Local 174, Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America v. Lucas Flour Company, 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) Professor Fiss argues that the dispute
resolution process which best meets society’s needs is the public system.
Arthur Miller, Maybe the Light at the end of the tunnel is the Litigation Explosion, IMPLODING
DEFENSE COUNSEL JOURNAL (July 1994). Professor Miller points out that the initial predictions
about the litigation explosion may have been a bit over-stated. The congested court system, tort reform
and new court rules may have slowed down the “explosion,” but the court system still has high costs and
lots of delays.
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passing year has brought more rules, more fees, more costs and more delays
to a system already infamous for such things. The legal system has become
like Professor Randy Harris’ restaurant analogy.7 If a person has always
dined at the same restaurant because it had good food at reasonable prices,
how long will that person continue to dine at the restaurant if the quality of
the food and service go down and the prices go up? How long will that
person continue to eat lousy food served by slow waiters at high prices
before they consider other alternatives such as fast food restaurants? People
who are fed up with the legal system are more receptive to trying ADR to
resolve their conflicts.
For nearly two hundred years, “binding arbitration” was an oxymoron in
American law; because United States courts refused to enforce binding
arbitration agreements. American courts followed the English common law
view that binding pre-dispute arbitration was unenforceable. However, in a
series of federal court decisions over the past thirty years, the federal
judiciary has established a favorable federal policy toward enforcement of
arbitration agreements.8 The strong federal policy in favor of enforcement
of arbitration agreements is a complete about face from the common law

7

8

Randy Harris is a professor at Abilene Christian University and uses the restaurant analogy to explain the
nature of changes.
Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984)
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view of arbitration as a revocable agency agreement.9 A quick review of
arbitration’s more recent history reveals that this shift in the federal
judiciary’s view toward arbitration came about as the result of the Federal
Arbitration Act.10
Arbitration at common law was a creature of contract, and due to the
revocability doctrine, arbitration contracts were not enforceable.11 Although
contract law has governed arbitration agreements for hundreds of years, until
the passage of the FAA enforcement of agreements to arbitrate rather than
litigate were treated by the American courts as a legal nullity.12 The Federal
Arbitration Act combined the rules governing arbitration under contract law
with the equity enforcement powers of specific performance. Agreements to
arbitrate may be enforced under the specific performance mandates of the
FAA in every court in the land.13 Tying arbitration and specific performance
together resulted in a previously non-binding process becoming a binding
process. Thus, the FAA created a synergy.
Specific performance is an equitable remedy in contracts cases that
allows a party to a contract to move the court to compel performance by the
other party of the agreed upon terms in the contract, because money
9

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
9 U.S.C. 1 et. seq.
11
Tobey v. County of Bristol, Fed. Case No, 14065, at 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). This American case redated the English Common law doctrine of revocability.
12
Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874).
13
9 U.S.C. 2
10
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damages would not be an adequate remedy for breach of the agreement.14
The essentia of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, codified at 9 USCA 1,
et. seq. is specific performance enforcement of the terms of contractual predispute arbitration agreements. A motion to compel arbitration under 9 USC
4 is, in reality, a motion to compel specific performance, because litigation is
not an adequate remedy.15 Thus, when Congress passed the Federal
Arbitration Act in an effort to overcome longstanding judicial hostility and
place contracts to arbitrate upon the same footing as other contracts,
congress made agreements to arbitrate subject to the specific performance
remedy.16 Prior to the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act, specific
performance was not available in arbitration contracts.17
One of the major areas of controversy in arbitration law since the FAA
was passed has been whether the FAA was intended to be procedural law
applicable only in federal courts or substantive law applicable in all courts.
Until more recent times, the FAA was considered to be applicable only in
federal courts. Justice Stevens concurring opinion in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and Justice O’Connor’s dissent touched upon
this misunderstanding. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Allied

14

Ruder v. Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 235 N.Y.S. 2d 191 (1962).
9 U.S.C.A. 1 et. seq.
16
Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 149 L. Ed. 2d 234 (2001)
17
Kulnkundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F. 2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942)
15
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Bruce Terminex v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), pointed out that congress
never intended for the FAA to apply in state courts. Justice Thomas’ and
Justice Scalia dissented in Terminex and stated they did not believe the FAA
applied in state courts. Legal scholars are also divided on this issue.18
There are numerous scholarly articles about binding pre-dispute
arbitration agreements. Practically all major legal publications, including
law journals and law reviews, have contained at least one article about
contractual binding arbitration within the past ten years. Some of the more
recent articles focus on the advantages and disadvantages of binding predispute arbitration clauses as they apply to disputes between businesses and
consumers and binding arbitration agreements in employment contract
disputes.19 The opposite conclusions reached by the legal scholars who have
written articles on this subject reveal there is much room for debate by the
academy in this area of contract law.
The society of scholars is also sharply divided between two views of
how the FAA should be applied, neither of which could be labeled as the
dominant position on contractually binding arbitration. The more traditional
18

Professor David Schwartz of the University of Wisconsin Law School believes that the FAA should only
apply in Federal courts, while Professor Christopher Drahoyal of the University of Kansas School of Law
contends Congress intended for the FAA to apply in state courts. Both professors have articles regarding
federal preemption under the FAA in the Spring 2004 issue of Dispute Resolution Magazine.
19
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams 149 L.Ed. 2d 234 (2001) The U.S. Supreme Court held that contracts
of employment are within the reach of the FAA. The court held the FAA pre-empts contrary state law on
employment agreements. The ruling refused to consider the state intrusion agreements of 22 attorneys
general in their amici briefs field in this case.
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view is that binding contractual arbitration is inseparably yoked to contract
law and is subject to examination under contract law principles.20 The other
prevalent view of binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements is that although
such clauses are subject to legal contract defenses, such clauses should also
be examined for the fairness of their resulting effect on the contracting
parties.21 Both views have merit. Binding arbitration agreements are
contracts and should be subjected to contract law principles. However,
when specific performance of a binding pre-dispute arbitration agreement is
sought, it must be remembered that the origin of specific performance as a
remedy is equity and not law.22 Equity principles demand an examination of
the fairness of the outcome prior to awarding the remedy.23 Colleagues in
the academy have consistently advocated for either the traditional contract
interpretation analysis or the resulting fairness effect analysis. Neither side
has been able to win the argument, and the debate continues.
This article will not advocate for the traditional analysis or the resulting
fairness effect analysis, but will endeavor to, provide a reflective
examination of binding arbitration based upon specific performance
principles, examine the origins of the arbitration process and the subsequent
20

Stephen J. Ware, Paying the price of process, 2001 J. DISP. RES. 89 (2001)
Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway widens doorway to impoing unfair binding arbitration on consumers, FLA.
BAR JOURNAL, NN. 1999
22
“Smith’s Remedies Tutorial,” WEST, NET (2004).
23
P.Tucker, “The Early History of the Court of Chancery: A comparative study”, ENGLISH
HISTORICAL REVIEW, Sept. 2000.
21
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mutations and transformations that has guided its history. The article will
show that the binding arbitration process began as an adjunct to the
adjudication process, and it was within the control of the legal system.
Binding arbitration was modified over the centuries into a non-binding
process governed by agency and contract rules in the common law.
Arbitration was then transformed by statutory law in 1925, into a binding
process governed by specific performance principles and contract law. The
resulting fairness effect analysis adds equity principles to the examination of
arbitration agreements, and this view challenges not only the effect of
binding arbitration upon the contracting parties contractual rights but also
the impact of such clauses upon the parties constitutional rights.24
Numerous articles have been published about the effects of binding
consumer arbitration on constitutional rights. Legal scholars are troubled by
the access to justice and procedural problems associated with consumer
arbitration.25 Some scholars have gone so far as to declare consumers
24

Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway Widens Door to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on Consumers, 71
NOV. FL. B.J. 8 (1997).
25
Richard C. Reuben, First options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of Reparability: Restoring
Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. 819, 829-888 (2003)
Some of the major problems associated with binding arbitration are the possibilities of gross
substantive and procedural injustices due to the absence of legal standards, capricious awards and
uncorrectable awards, and incentives to favor repeat players over one time players. The assent of the
parties to arbitration and denial of their access to the judicial system has become a major issue in the
arbitration controversy. Professor Reuben discusses the procedures courts use to determine whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate, including the so-called separability doctrine, and concludes it has the
appearance of a shell game. Arbitrators are allowed to decide fraud issues and other matters normally
reserved for the courts. Professor Reuben discusses the tension between First Options of Chicago v.
Kaplan and Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood and Conklin Mfg. Co. The First Options case held that courts,
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“victims” of the arbitration process.26 Other scholars have suggested revising
the arbitration process, and taking steps to make arbitration a fair process for
all who are involved in it.27 A variety of unique issues exist with regard to
specific performance of arbitration agreements in consumer cases, and the

not arbitrators, are to decide whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate based upon actual, rather than
implied assent. Prima Paint held that the arbitration clause should be treated as a separate contract from
its container contract, and it may be held valid even if the container contract is held invalid. Professor
Reuben also contrasts the basic tension between freedom to contract versus the rule of law. The former
view favors arbitration, while the later favors the preservation of judicial access. Professor Reuben also
discusses the French doctrine of competence-competence regarding the arbitrator’s independent authority
to decide issues, and uses substantive arbitrability versus procedural arbitrability to explain the concept.
The courts decide substantive arbitrability (was there an agreement to arbitrate?), and the arbitrator
decides procedural arbitrability (conditions necessary to trigger a duty to arbitrate). The view of federal
courts that arbitrator’s rule on. The issues after the courts rule there is an agreement to arbitrate places
non-lawyer arbitrators in the awkward position of endeavoring to analyze legal defenses such as fraud.
In some instances, not only are the parties denied their day in court, they are also denied their legal
defenses to the contract. Professor Reuben concludes that the courts should move toward actual consent
to arbitrate, rather than implied consent to arbitrate under the separability doctrine.
26
Richard B. Cappalli, Arbitration of Consumer Claims: The Sad Case of Two-Time Victim Terry Johnson
or Where Have You Gone Learned Hand?, BOSTON PUBLIC INTERST LAW JOURNAL 367-376
Summer 2001
Cappalli cites a dismissal of a class action and order to arbitration as an example of sellers and lenders
avoiding legislation protecting consumers by the insertion of binding arbitration agreements into
adhesion contracts. He also cites the court’s endeavor to lessen their own workloads by compelling cases
to arbitration on almost any ground available. Cappalli describes the “powerful presumption” in federal
courts favoring arbitration as a “heavy burden” on consumer protection challenges. He describes
“insurmountable barriers” as a game the consumer cannot win. Cappalli points out that the U.S. Supreme
Court ahs fashioned a liberal policy favoring arbitration from the FAA, a statute which actually states to
treat arbitration agreements no differently from any other contract. He accuses the courts of using any
excuse to shift litigation out of the system due to the heavy docket pressure. In an interesting analogy
Cappali describes the U.S. Supreme Courts “doctrine” concerning arbitration as “the-elbow-on-the-scale
boost to arbitration.” Cappalli points out hat the consumer plaintiffs cannot get the same relief from an
arbitral panel that is available in a court, due to big business being able to eliminate class actions through
arbitration.
27
Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory
Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1040-1047 (1998)
Federal policy favors arbitral dispute resolution in response to overcrowded dockets, but the extent
of favoritism granted to arbitration is a major departure from previous practice and the early
interpretations of the FAA. The individual state no longer has the power to regulate arbitration
agreements due to the federal policy favoring arbitration. Adhesive contracts of employment containing
arbitration clauses are being used to determine employee statutory rights. The logic behind the federal
courts interpretation of the FAA rests on two assumptions: Arbitration is different but not inferior to
courts, and that parties should be allowed to judge their own best interest. In Allied Bruce Terminex v.
Dobson, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the arguments of 20 state attorney’s general against extending
the reach of the FAA. In Doctors Associates v. Casarotto the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Mortano’s
requirement that the notice of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in a contract be in bold letters. States
are not allowed to police the fairness of an arbitration agreement due to preemption by the FAA.
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available literature reveals some of these issues are access to justice, access
to process, legality of the award and limitations on judicial review.28
Some scholars suggest that specific performance of arbitration
agreements under the FAA should not be permitted for statutory claims
affecting the parties rights, but it appears that the federal courts have little
interest in creating an escape route for such claims.29 The United States
Supreme Court and the federal judiciary continue to issue opinions favoring
specific performance of arbitration contracts as an alternative forum to
litigation. The federal judiciary apparently believes that the positives of
binding arbitration outweigh any negatives attached to this process. A brief
history of the arbitration process, specific performance and the evolution of
arbitration case law provide a necessary foundation for an in-depth
examination of the existing controversy. The foundation being laid, this
article will then discuss the synergism of contract law and equity which
gives the FAA its power, the applicable equity Maxims and defenses to
arbitration clauses. Resistive efforts by states and consumer groups to the
arbitration process including varied perspectives will be discussed. The
28
29

See Reuben, Supra FN 25.
Joseph A. Arnold, The Circumvention of Compulsory Arbitration: Two Bites at the Apple, or a
Restoration of Employees’ Statutory Rights:, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1207 (2003).
This article argues of a choice by employees to refuse to sign an arbitration agreement without being
forced to forego employment. The Supreme Court in EEOC v. Waffle House affirmed the EEOC’s
ability to proceed independent of the employee’s agreement to arbitrate, but this case offers little to
protection to employees individually. This article argues for the employee’s right to enter into a mutual
agreement rather than a unilateral waiver of rights in a “take it or leave it” employment agreement.
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reality of the process compared to the theory of the process will also be
discussed.
HISTORY OF ARBITRATION:
The recorded history of arbitration began with a busy judge spending
his days resolving people’s problems by hearing cases from early in the
morning until late at night. The judge’s father-in-Law saw the chaotic
situation and asked the judge, “Why are you doing this all by yourself?”
The judge responded that people have many problems, and when problems
arise people come to him for resolution. The father-in-law said, “This is no
way to go about it. You will burn out.” The father-in-law suggested that the
judge select some competent, incorruptible people of integrity to act as
private judges of the people’s problems. The big cases could still be
presented to the judge, but the everyday business problems would be
decided by these private judges acting as arbiters. The judge took his fatherin-law’s advice and appointed a group of competent people to decide the
people’s everyday problems. The arbiters judged the routine cases, but the
hard cases were still heard by the public judge. This was the first recorded
implementation of an arbitration process.30

30

EUGENE H. PETERSON, The Message, p. 135, 136 NAVE PRESS PUBLISHING GROUP, Colorado
Springs, 1995.
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The above conversation did not take place in the chambers of a famous
jurist. It took place in a wilderness area east of Egypt around 1250
B.C.31 The public judge was Moses, the leader of the Jewish exodus from
Egypt, and his father-in-law Jethro was an Arab priest. The conversation
between them, which gave rise to the first recorded use of the binding
arbitration process, is recorded in the Bible in the eighteenth chapter of the
book of Exodus. The quoted words of Jethro are taken from The Message,32
a contemporary language version of the Bible. It is not known if Jethro
invented the idea of binding arbitration or if it was a familiar process used in
the ancient Middle Eastern world. Both Jethro and Moses seemed familiar
with the process, and their familiarity could indicate the process was already
an acceptable form of dispute resolution in Egypt and Arabia. The book
containing the exchange between Moses and Jethro was written over thirty
centuries ago, making it by far the oldest known reference to the use of
binding arbitration.33
When courts and dispute resolution professionals refer to arbitration as
an alternative forum to litigation, it creates a presumption that jury trials
preceded arbitration. Contrary to the assumptions being made about
The book of Exodus in the Bible contains the first known reference to binding arbitration. Moses led
the Jews out of Egypt around 1250 B.C. over 3,200 years ago. The nation of Israel numbered in the
millions, and problems were abundant within this massive company of people.
31
THE MASTER BIBLE, J. Wesley Dickson & Co. Indianapolis, 1957, P. 1730.
32
See PETERSON Supra, FN 30.
33
See MASTER BIBLE, Supra FN 31.
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arbitration by its opponents, arbitration was not invented as an alternative to
the jury trial, because the arbitration process pre-dates the jury trial by at
least a thousand years.34 The theory behind arbitration has always been to
speed up the dispute resolution process while unburdening the public justice
system. In the days of Moses the public justice system was backlogged with
cases, and Moses, the only public judge who heard those cases, was
overworked.35 The process resulted in justice being dispensed at a painfully
slow pace by a burned out judge. The arbitrators suggested by Jethro sped
up the process and relieved Moses of the incredible burden of hearing every
case arising in a group of people who in number could match the population
of a major U.S. city.36 The arbitrators freed Moses to decide the tough cases,
which could not be arbitrated and allowed him to conduct other important
business. The argument of the modern advocates for arbitration is
essentially the same argument used to justify arbitration in Moses day.37

34

William A. Forsyth, History of Trial By Jury Frederick D. Linnad Company, JERSEU CITY (1875).
No one seems to know just when the jury trial originated. In England it seems to have been traced to
the Anglo-Saxon times, but others argue about it was a product of the ancient courts of Teutonic nations.
Although there is some evidence that the Scandinavians may have enjoyed the benefits of the jury trial as
early as 750 A.D., the earliest clues pointing to a jury trial originate in ancient Rome. There is a popular
legend that the Romans borrowed the jury trial from the ancient Greeks.
35
See PETERSON Supra, FN 30.
36
Id. The Jews in Moses company numbered in the millions.
37
Stephen J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements,
2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89 (2001).
Competition forces to pass along the savings obtained from arbitration (reduced costs and reduced
exposure) to the consumer. Professor Ware points out that businesses tend to be “profit-maximizing”
organizations. Professor Ware points out businesses will usually follow the rate-of-return equalization
principle.
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American courts are full of crowded dockets and overworked judges and
binding arbitration does provide some relief for those conditions.
There is a steady stream of historical references to the binding
arbitration process spanning the centuries since Moses lived.38 Romans used
arbitration in civil matters on a limited basis, and as Rome conquered
Europe they spread its use throughout Europe before the Middle Ages.
Moses and the Jewish people became accustomed to the presence of
arbitrators in their midst. Throughout the Bible various references are made
to judges who served in Israel.39 Those arbitrators were heroes who led the
Jewish people during some very rough times of oppression, but all of them
were also people who served as arbiters of the peoples’ problems.40
References in Islamic literature reveal arbitration was used to settle disputes
as early as the 7th Century A.D.41
In its purest form, arbitration is simply a form of private judging.
Jewish rabbinical courts have used the arbitration model for the resolution of
complaints for hundreds of years.42 Modern Rabbinical courts consist of
rabbis who are well versed in the Torah (Jewish law). The Torah arbitration
38

Douglas Hurt Yarn, Commercial Arbitration In Olde England, DISPUTE RESOLUTION JOURNAL,
January 1995
The oldest evidence of arbitration in post-Roman England is the Anglo-Saxon’s arbitration of pending
judicial cases. During the middle ages the courts and arbitration were somewhat inseparable. As a
result, arbitrations in Olde England had similar characteristics to an adjudication process.
39
See MASTER BIBLE, Supra, FN 31, The Book of Judges.
40
Id.
41
Abualy A. Aziz, Ima’mat in Arabia 600-765 A.D. History of Ismailism website, 2004.
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process involves rabbis who serve as judges, but who are not employed by a
public court system.43 During the Middle Ages arbitration was used to
resolve problems in the guild system.44
Arbitration came to the United States as a result of its use in Europe.
United States law is based predominantly upon English law. The English
have used arbitration successfully to resolve disputes for centuries as an
adjunct process to its judicial system. In the United States two of the more
famous individuals who have been involved in the arbitration process are
George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. Washington himself was an
arbitrator and used arbitration to resolve land disputes in the state of
Virginia.45 Lincoln served as a judge and arbitrator in Illinois.46 Lincoln
developed a reputation as a fair arbiter of disputes and served as a referee in
horse races and cock fights.47
Arbitration in Europe was a binding semi-judicial process until it was
changed by the English Common Law. Under the common law, arbitration
42

Rabbinical Counsel of California. Rabbinical Administrators handle financial arbitration, conversion,
divorce and miscellaneous matters.
43
Christopher R. Drahozal, A Behavioral Analysis of Private Judgery, paper prepared for a symposium on
“The Coming Crisis in Mandatory Arbitration: New perspectives and possibilities,” DUKE
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, October 4-5, 2002. Professor Drahozal discussed the behavioral
aspects of arbitrators and how bias may affect their decisions making.
44
Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85
CALF. L. REV. 577 (1997)
45
T.H Matteson, “George Washington, Boy Hero and Arbitrator”, CIRCA 1740, PICTURE HISTORY
LLC (2003)
46
Abraham Lincoln Research site, Morton 2004. Lincoln served briefly as a judge and arbitrator and his
service as a referee in contests made him famous in Illinois.
47
Id.
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was not considered an ironclad, binding process.48 In fact, the common law
treated arbitration as a revocable principle-agent process up until the time
the arbitration hearing actually took place.49 Arbitrators were deemed to be
the agents of the parties, and under common law an agency can be revoked
at any time.50 The 1845 case of Tobey v. County of Bristol51 is an example of
how American courts adopted the English common law approach prior to the
Federal Arbitration Act providing for statutory arbitration. The English
courts began to treat contracts for arbitration as non-binding under what
became known as the revocability doctrine that was set forth in Vynoir’s
case.52 The essence of the revocability doctrine is that as agents of the parties
the agency of the arbitrators can be revoked any time prior to the actual
arbitration hearing. In the 1918 case of Hedley v. Aetna,53 it was held that
agreements to oust or defeat the jurisdiction of courts as to the resolution of
differences between the parties were not allowed. This is an example of the

48

Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942). Agreements to
arbitrate had little validity at common law. Parties were not bound by agreements to arbitrate unless and
until they actually arbitrated.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Tobey v. County of Bristol, Fed. Case. No. 14065, at 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845). This case held that
when parties agree that arbitration agreements are irrevocable it serves no purpose, because arbitration
agreements are, by their very nature revocable. See also Insurance Company v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451
(1874). A party cannot bind himself in advance by an agreement to arbitrate, but may select the courts or
arbitration whenever he decides to present the case.
52
Vynoir’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B. 1609)
53
Headley v. Aetna, 80 So. 466, 202 Ala. 384 (1918). Parties are not allowed to enter an agreement to
arbitrate that will be held to bind the parties to arbitration after a dispute arises. Such agreements would
effectively oust or defeat the jurisdiction of courts.
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so-called judicial hostility that was pervasive in the U.S. Court system until
the time of the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act.
In 1925, the United States Congress enacted the United States
Arbitration Act, and this Act was codified in 1947, as the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA).54 The purpose of the FAA was to eliminate the judicial hostility
that had existed at common law against arbitration.55 At common law, once
the parties had arbitrated a case and received an award, one of them had to
bring suit for the enforcement of the award. Under statutory arbitration, such
as was envisioned by the FAA, the party would simply file a motion to
confirm the award.56 If a case was pending at the time, the arbitration award
would become the final judgment of the court in that case, and a separate
action to enforce the award would not be required.57 Pragmatically, the
common-law doctrine of revocability died with the FAA. With the passage
54

9 U.S.C. 1 et. seq.
Southland Corporation v. Keating, 465 U.S.1 (1984)
The owner and franchiser of a chain of convenience stores was sued in a class action that included
more than 800 of its franchisees. The California Superior court held that arbitration was appropriate,
except in the California Franchise Investment Law Claims. The California Court of Appeals held that all
the claims were arbitrable, but the California Supreme Court held that the trial court had been correct in
excluding arbitration for the California Franchise Investment Law Claims. The California Supreme
Court also held that the Franchise Investment Law Claims did not contravene the FAA. The U.S.
Supreme Court in its opinion delivered by Justice Berger held that the claims were arbitrable and subject
to the FAA. The plaintiff had contended the FAA was a federal procedural act and did not apply in state
court, but Justice Berger’s opinion held that the Commerce Clause made the FAA applicable in all
courts. Of interest in the case is the position of Justice O’Connor that state law claims are not subject to
federal perception. Justice Berger did not agree with Justice O’Connor’s more narrow view of the
commerce clause. Writing for the majority, Justice Berger held that the California law violated the
Supremacy Clause and was thus pre-empted. Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion stated that the limited
objective of the Federal Arbitration Act was to abrogate the common-law rule against specific
enforcement of arbitration agreements. Justice O’Connor’s dissent characterized the Federal Arbitration
Act as a procedural statute applicable only in federal courts.
56
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.1, Section 9.
57
Id.
55

18

of the FAA the federal courts began to treat arbitration as a contract for
specific performance rather than as a common-law agency arrangement.
Under statutory arbitration, an agreement to arbitrate becomes a specific
performance issue that can be the subject of a motion to compel performance
of the contract in lieu of litigation.58 The FAA effectively did away with
common law arbitration and allowed parties to contract for specific
performance of arbitration, which yielded results that were binding.59
New York became the first state to pass a statutory arbitration law in
1920.60 The United States Arbitration Act of 1925 was modeled after the
New York arbitration statute.61 After much discussion and not a few
hearings on the effect of a national arbitration statute, the United States
Arbitration Act was passed as an Article III federal procedural act.62 In 1947,
the United States Arbitration Act became the FAA in its present form as
codified in 9 United States Code Section 1 et. seq. Although the FAA calls
for the enforcement of binding arbitration agreements, many jurists assumed
it only applied in federal courts. State courts were reluctant to follow the
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specific performance mandates of the FAA and state laws continued to deny
specific performance in arbitration cases.63
Believing the FAA to be an Article III procedural act, the federal courts
did not initially interfere with states that refused specific performance of
arbitration agreements in their state court cases. Statutory rights cases in
federal courts were also considered “off limits” for specific performance of
arbitration agreements. Wilco v. Swan64 is an example of the United States
Supreme Court’s attitude toward the FAA in statutory rights cases prior to
the high courts more recent policy in favor of binding arbitration. Federal
cases prior to Wilco v. Swan demonstrate that although the FAA’s specific
performance mandates were recognized as substantive federal law, the FAA
was not enforced against parties seeking to litigate their statutory rights.65
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon66 changed the way the federal
courts viewed binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements in statutory rights
claims cases. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon created a significant
burden for statutory rights claimants endeavoring to defeat the specific
63
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performance requirements of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. The
plaintiff seeking to avoid arbitration is required to prove that the U.S.
Congress intended the statutory right be litigated and excluded from
arbitration.67 This presents an impossible burden of proof for plaintiffs in
most cases, because the congressional record on these acts did not contain
references to litigation rights or arbitration.
The utilization of binding arbitration in the United States has increased
at a rapid pace in consumer cases due to the holdings of the United States
Supreme Court during the past quarter century in cases involving the FAA.68
Despite the federal courts receptiveness to arbitration, the state courts were
especially slow to enforce specific performance of arbitration against
consumers due to its procedural nature and the remaining hostility toward
arbitration in the judicial system.69
The FAA was supported by the business sector from the initial drafting
stage to the passage of the Act in 1925, and business lawyers lobbied hard
for the act’s passage.70 There was and is a reason for the business
communities’ historical support of binding consumer arbitration over
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litigation.71 Businesses have used the FAA to reduce litigation expenses,
eliminate runaway verdicts and predict outcomes.72 Businesses have a long
history with the arbitration process, but consumers have little, if any,
experience with binding arbitration.73 If knowledge is power, the business
community has achieved a higher degree of power than the average
consumer with this process.
HISTORY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE:
Specific performance is an equitable remedy.74 Although courts of
equity and courts of law are no longer separate courts in most states, in early
English law these courts were very distinct.75 Courts of law provided the
remedy of damages, while courts of chancery dealt with equity matters.76
The presiding official in a law court was a judge, a lawyer turned jurist who
had earned a reputation as a good legal mind.77 The presiding official in a
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court of chancery was called a chancellor.78 The background of the early
chancellors was that of a cleric or an accomplished politician who was
appointed by the King or Queen of England.79 Chancellors were often
members of the clergy who had the political savory necessary to gain
appointment as a chancellor. Parties to a civil action were not sent to a
chancery court unless the potential damages in their legal case were
inadequate.80 A contracts case would not be referred to a chancery court to
obtain an equitable remedy such as specific performance unless the legal
remedy for breach was totally inappropriate.81
Jury trials were not permitted in chancery courts, because the chancellor
decided the case using equitable principles.82 The King of England set up
the chancery courts to operate under a different set of rules from those
utilized in law courts.83 The guiding principle of chancery courts of equity
was to produce decisions based on fairness rather than on the technicalities
of the law.84 Chancery courts differed from law courts in that they could
order a party to do something (specific performance) or refrain from doing
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something (injunction).85 Over the centuries the chancery court became
corrupt, costly and slow.86 In England, the court of Chancery was abolished
by the Judicature Act of 1873, and the chancery court became a division of
the High Court of Justice.87
Most of the chancery or equity courts have also disappeared in the
United States. Some states like Delaware and Tennessee still have chancery
courts, but the vast majority of states grant equity powers to their superior or
circuit courts, thereby allowing these courts to sit as both a court of equity
and a court of law.88 When deciding equity matters, these courts are
required to use the same Maxims of equity utilized by the chancery courts.89
These merged courts allow for a more efficient system of implementing
justice, because one court can award damages and/or specific performance.90
The courts of equity in existence in most states in modern times are the
bankruptcy courts.91 The original chancery courts of equity operated under
the jurisdiction and authority of the English monarch to order specific acts.92
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The power of the monarch was replaced by the state constitutions and
statutes in the United States, which govern court jurisdiction.93
Chancery courts would not grant specific performance each time a
contract was breached.94 In order to obtain specific performance, an
aggrieved party had to demonstrate a unique set of circumstances from
which the chancellor could determine that legal damages would not be
suitable.95 Chancery courts also used certain Maxims such as laches,
estoppel and the clean hands doctrine (he who seeks equity, must do equity)
to screen the cases to be heard.96 If the aggrieved party had violated one of
these Maxims no relief was available in the chancery courts.97 The chancery
courts also examined any underlying contract to determine if the terms of the
contract were unenforceable or unconscionable.98 In modern times, a party
seeking specific performance is not required to meet these heavy burdens of
proof that were necessary to get a case heard in the chancery courts.
In American courts the specific enforcement of contracts is also
governed by the principles of the UCC, especially Article 2, which governs
sales contracts.99 UCC 2-716 provides that specific performance may be
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available when the goods are unique.100 UCC 2-302 permits courts to
declare a contract unfair and decline to enforce it.101 Arbitration agreements
are usually constructed in such a way that any legal remedy would be
inadequate for their breach, and the only remedy that makes sense is specific
performance.
“The maxim, ‘he who seeks equity must do equity’ presupposes that
equitable, as distinguished from legal, rights have arisen from the subjectmatter in favor of each of the parties; and it requires that such rights shall not
be enforced in favor of one who affirmatively seeks their enforcement
except upon condition that he consents to accord to the other party the same
correlative equitable rights.”102 “Legal rights are as safe in chancery as they
are in a court of law, and however strong an appeal may be to the conscience
of a chancellor for equitable relief, he is powerless to grant if the one from
whom it must come will be deprived of a legal right.”103 These quotes are
from cases decided in the first half of the twentieth century, and they purport
to require anyone seeking specific performance to grant to their opposing
party the same equitable rights they seek and not violate the other party’s
legal rights. As will be shown in this article’s review of more modern cases,
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these equitable maxims have all but disappeared from consideration in ruling
upon the validity of arbitration contracts.
Specific performance allows a court of equity to compel a party to
perform under a contract.104 Courts of equity have discretion over whether
to order performance and may refuse to do so if the terms of the contract are
unfair, the consideration inadequate, if the enforcement of the contract will
cause unreasonable hardship or loss or if the contract was secured by
misrepresentation.105 Prior to the modern era of FAA enforcement of
arbitration agreements through specific performance, it was generally
understood that courts would not compel specific performance of arbitration
agreements lest they oust their own jurisdiction in such matters.106 At
common law arbitration agreements could not be specifically enforced.107
Through the years following the passage of the FAA, the aversion to order
specific enforcement of arbitration contracts disappeared, along with most of
specific performance’s equity hurdles.
THE EVOLUTION OF ARBITRATION CASE LAW:
One of the most cited cases regarding the federal policy favoring
arbitration is Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction
104
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Company.108 The Moses H. Cone case involved a North Carolina Hospital
and an Alabama Contractor. Justice Brennen in Moses H. Cone opined,
“there is a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,” and his words from
that decision have appeared in a significant number of cases sustaining the
current liberal federal policy toward arbitration. Those words have been
used to by-pass consideration of equity principles in the legal analysis of
arbitration clauses by federal courts.
The liberal federal policy soon found its way from federal courts into
state court cases and pre-empted contrary state law. Southland v. Keating,109
a California case, held that a California statute which invalidated specific
performance under certain arbitration agreements deemed covered by the
FAA violated the Supremacy Clause and the California statute was thus preempted by the FAA. This was one of the first cases to disavow the state law
claims argument that claims arising in state court involving state laws are
not subject to the FAA’s federal preemption. The state law claims argument
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was that the FAA is a federal procedural act under Article III and should
only cover federal claims in federal court. The majority in Southland held
that Congress intended for the Commerce Clause to be read broadly and,
therefore, the FAA presumptively applies in all state and federal courts to all
arbitration agreements.110 However, Justice O’Connor’s dissent in
Southland stated significant reasons to keep the traditional view of the
FAA’s application limited to federal courts as an Article III procedural act,
and not as a substantive law statute.111 Justice O’Connor pointed out the
FAA’s legislative history was unambiguous, and that from the outset
Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute only applicable in federal
courts.
A few years later, the United States Supreme Court held in Volt
Information Sciences v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University112 that California law could prescribe procedures for the
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arbitration process that were different from those described in the Federal
Arbitration Act as long as the contract between the parties had agreed
California law would be used to govern the arbitration agreement. The state
law the of California was named by the parties as the governing law of
contract in the Volt case. Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Volt stated
that the FAA was designed to overcome the judicial hostility toward
arbitration, but it was not designed to make every case arbitrable every
time.113 The FAA was designed to put arbitration clauses on the same
footing as other contracts.114 Volt was temporarily viewed as a softening of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s substantive law stance on the applicability of the
FAA, but a New York case and an Alabama case soon proved that the U.S.
Supreme Court was not backing down from its substantive law policy
regarding the FAA’s specific performance mandates regarding pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.
In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinions in Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton115 and Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson.116 These
113
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two cases affirmed the court’s pre-Volt stance of pre-empting any state law
in conflict with the FAA’s specific performance mandates on grounds that
the FAA is the substantive law of the land applicable in all courts.117 In
Mastrobuono the court held that a New York statute which disallowed
punitive damages in arbitration, could not be used to disallow punitive
damages awarded by arbitrators.118 The Supreme Court held that the parties’
contract contained no reference to punitive damages being excluded and,
therefore, punitive damages were permissible.119 Although the contract
stated it would be governed by the laws of the state of New York, which
disallows punitive damages, the contract also designated the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) arbitration rules as the process
rules for the arbitration. The NASD rules allowed arbitrators to return
punitive damages and other relief, and the Supreme Court interpreted the
NASD rules permitted punitive damages under the FAA.120 Mastroubouno
implied that a party could get the same relief in arbitration as in court, which
may have been the underlying message the Supreme Court was endeavoring
to send about arbitration’s separate, but allegedly equal forum status.
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Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson involved an Alabama homeowner
who purchased a house with an existing termite guarantee plan.121 A termite
infestation caused damage to the house and following failed attempts to
correct the damage, the homeowner sued Terminex. The termite plan was
not a contract between the homeowner and Terminex, but had been
transferred as a part of the closing documents when the homeowner
purchased the house from the prior owner.122 The Supreme Court of
Alabama refused to order specific performance of an arbitration provision in
the termite plan based upon Alabama’s anti-predispute arbitration statute
which declared pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate unenforceable.123
The U.S. Supreme Court in Terminex held that the Alabama statute
prohibiting specific performance of pre-dispute arbitration agreements was
unconstitutional if the contract containing the arbitration clause led to a
transaction involving interstate commerce.124 The shipment of pest control
chemicals from outside the state of Alabama into Alabama to treat the house
was deemed sufficient to bring the contract under the Commerce Clause and
thus subject it to the Supremacy Clause. The Alabama statute conflicted with
the FAA mandates for specific performance of an arbitration agreement, and
121
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it was pre-empted by the FAA under the Supremacy Clause.125 Although the
pre-dispute arbitration clause in the termite plan was unenforceable under
Alabama law, specific performance of the arbitration agreement was
enforced rigorously under the FAA.126 Alabama law was the law of the
contract, but Alabama law was not allowed to govern the contract’s
arbitration clause. The Terminex decision and the Mastroburono decision
created a judicial oddity. The arbitration clauses were enforceable under
federal law, while the remainder of the contracts were subject to state law.
There was much confusion in Alabama’s legal community, over the
U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Terminex. The Alabama Supreme Court’s
Terminex opinion after the remand expressed some of that confusion.127 The
Alabama Supreme Court ruling on remand of the Terminex decision
contained a concurring opinion that could best be described as an indication
of one justice’s frustration with the views of his fellow justices.128
Alabama’s code law on arbitration was effective before the FAA became
effective federal policy.129 Some in Alabama’s legal community felt
Terminex was an intrusion into Alabama’s right to establish its own contract
125
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law pertaining to arbitration. As will be shown later in this note, Alabama’s
Supreme Court did not accept the U.S. Supreme Courts’ broad reading of the
commerce power of Congress and took the initiative to preserve Alabama’s
public policy.130
It is easy to understand why state courts felt they had a “green light”
from the United States Supreme Court to apply state contract law to
arbitration clauses contained in a contract governed by a named state law.
The Volt case created that presumption. Apparently, the United States
Supreme Court in the Volt opinion was not stating that any state law could
be applied to arbitration agreements contained in a contract governed by
state law, but only state law that allowed arbitration clauses to operate on the
same footing as other contracts.131 The Volt case also led to the assumption
that states could limit the enforcement of arbitration clauses, as long as the
clauses were not struck down in their entirety. This soon proved to be an
erroneous assumption.
In Doctor’s Associates v. Casorotto132 the U.S. Supreme Court
effectively removed state law policies regarding specific performance
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restrictions in arbitration cases. The Cassaroto case involved a Montana
statute that required any contract subject to arbitration to contain a capital
letter notification regarding the arbitration clause on the first page of the
contract.133 The U.S. Supreme court pre-empted Montana’s notice statute
upon the grounds that it violated the “same footing as other contracts”
language of the FAA.134 The Cassorotto opinion served notice on the states
that they were not free to place their own restrictions on the specific
performance mandates of the FAA.
The above referenced U.S. Supreme Court decisions put to rest the state
law claims arguments against specific performance in binding consumer
arbitration and to some extent encouraged federal courts to engage in
judicial activism in favor of binding arbitration. In addition to pre-empting
any contrary state law prohibiting specific performance in arbitration
contracts, the United States Supreme Court also rendered decisions which
removed long-standing traditional doctrines such as the intertwining claims
doctrine. The intertwining doctrine as stated in DeLanire v. Birr, Wilson
and Co.135 is that arbitration should be denied where common law claims are
intertwined with rights based claims such as statutory violations of security
letter notice requirement went beyond the requirement of the FAA and was thus pre-empted under the
Supremacy Clause. This opinion made it clear that states do not have the right to pass laws that restrict
the effectiveness of the FAA.
133
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laws. The United States Supreme Court rejected the intertwining doctrine in
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd136 and held that the FAA requires federal
courts to compel arbitration in cases where the grounds of the various claims
are mixed. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Byrd stated that the strong
federal policy in favor of arbitration was not an admonition to use alternative
dispute resolution methods to settle cases, but a mandate for specific
enforcement of arbitration contracts.137
The United States Supreme Court has made the weight of the mandate
for specific performance in arbitration cases vividly clear. Longstanding
traditions notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has established a bright line
test for the applicability of specific performance to arbitration clauses in the
courts of this land.138 Federal law now favors specific performance of
arbitration clauses, and any order denying specific performance of a valid
arbitration clause must contain adequate and articulated reasons for the
denial of specific performance.139 Thus, case law has evolved from treating
arbitration agreements as totally unenforceable in the cases decided prior to
the FAA, to completely enforceable in most cases decided since the mid1980s’.

136

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
137

36

WHY IS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND BINDING ARBITRATION A
MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE?
The United States Supreme Court and the sundry federal courts can
issue all the legal decisions they desire regarding binding arbitration, but
absent the power of enforcement through the equitable remedy of specific
enforcement these decisions would be of little effect. The only remedy a
court of law can award is damages or dismissal, but a court with equity
powers can order the parties to take a course of action.140 Therefore, to
avoid court orders enforceable only by a grant of compensatory damages,
the courts had to marry the equity enforcement powers of specific
performance to contract law governing arbitration agreements to achieve the
goal of forcing parties to take a course of action. Some members of the bar
have become very troubled that existing contract law defenses and other
legal defenses related to their clients legal rights have been unsuccessful in
overcoming specific performance orders. However, one only has to look at
the nature of these defenses to understand why they fail against specific
performance. Asserting a legal defense to an equitable remedy will not work
because law is subservient to equity. Using the federal law versus state law
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analogy, equity preempts law. A legal right may not be exercised against an
equity order.141 Although courts of equity and courts of law are generally
merged, equity Maxims are still independently viable.142 Equity has clear
supremacy over law.143 The attorneys representing clients who wish to set
aside pre-dispute arbitration agreements face a significant hurdle. Legal
defenses are unavailable to challenge an equitable remedy, but the courts
have severely curtailed, and to some extent eliminated, the equitable
defenses to specific performance. Thus, the marriage of law to equity in
arbitration is not only marriage of convenience, it is a marriage of power.
EQUITY MAXIMS:
The enforcement of arbitration clauses through the equitable remedy of
specific performance is not a problem free environment. If a party seeks an
equitable remedy, that party allegedly subjects himself or herself to the
Maxims of Equity.144 The Maxims, or fundamental principles of equity are
as follows:
1.

Equity will not allow a Right to be without a Remedy.

2.

Equity follows the Law.

3.

He who seeks Equity must do Equity.
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4.

He who comes into Equity must come with Clean Hands.

5.

Delay defeats Equity.

6.

Equality is Equity.

7.

Equity views the Intent rather than the Form.

8.

Equity regards as Done what ought to be Done.

9.

Equity imputes an Intention to fulfill an Obligation.

10. Equity acts in Personam.
11. If the equities are equal, the first in time Prevails.
12. If the equities are equal, the Law prevails.145
Clearly, the supporters of binding arbitration love specific performance,
but from time to time seem to have difficulty with some of the Maxims of
Equity. These Maxims should theoretically be accepted to gain enforcement
of arbitration agreements through specific performance. Maxim one provide
that a party’s statutory rights must be preserved. Drafting techniques are
used to limit this Maxim’s equity defense by requiring parties to waive their
rights prior to any actual controversy. Most federal arbitration decisions
have held the aggrieved party’s rights were waived by contract when the
arbitration agreement was signed. Constitutional law cases regarding waiver
usually mention the words “freely”, “voluntarily” and “knowingly”
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somewhere in the decision. Perhaps more time should be devoted to a
discussion of whether legal and equitable rights can be freely, voluntarily
and knowingly waived if the party who waives them is unaware of their
existence or the effect of the waiver.
Maxim two is generally followed, except in the special rules applicable
to arbitration agreements. The so-called separability doctrine is one of these
special rules. Although arbitration clauses may be examined under the
general principles of contract law, the enforceability of the arbitration clause
itself must be examined separately from the underlying contract.146 If the
container contract is void, the arbitration clause may still be valid if a
separate analysis of the clause reveals it is enforceable.147
Due to case law in arbitration, the courts have carved out an exception
for arbitration clauses, which state that the arbitration clause must be
examined on a stand alone basis for its own validity.148 Therefore, it is
possible that the container contract will be void ab initio, while the
arbitration clause will be held valid, because the parties seeking to set it
aside cannot prove that the agreement to arbitrate was procured on the same
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an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33-36, 60-98, 111-126 (1997)
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basis as the container contract.149 In other words, to successfully attack an
arbitration agreement which is part of a voided container contract, the
complaining party must prove that the arbitration agreement itself was
procured by fraud or some other valid contract defense. This is an
exceedingly difficult burden for a complainant to carry, and it has resulted in
arbitration agreements being held valid which might have otherwise been
rejected as a part of the container contract. Although the Doctrine of
Severability of individual contract parts is not new to the area of contract
law, the Separability Doctrine is a new concept created to sustain what
would normally be unsustainable pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
agreements.
The doctrine of severablility, upon which the separability doctrine is
based, held that if a container contract was void because of a defense leading
to its recession, then the arbitration clause may survive.150 However, under
the severability doctrine, if the contract was void ab initio then even the
arbitration clause would be invalid and unenforceable.151 Under the
separability doctrine the courts treat the arbitration clause as a separate
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RAASCH v. NCR Corp. 254 F. Supp. 2d 847 (2003)
Tanya J. Monestier, “Nothing comes of nothing-or does it??? A critical re-examination of the doctrine
of separability in American Arbitration”, 12 AM. REV. INT’L AVG. 223 (2001)
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Id. at 227.
150

41

agreement which may be enforced independently of the underlying contract,
and may be held valid even if the contract as a whole was void ab initio.152
Equity Maxims four and five were problematic for arbitration’s
supporters until the “shrink wrap” cases. “Shrink wrap” cases are those
opinions which have held that arbitration agreements are valid that were
included in a package of documents delivered with a product.153 The
consumer purchaser neither read nor signed the agreements prior to the
delivery of the product. Although these “agreements” have the appearance
of an ambush, they have generally been held to be valid. This article will
discuss the “shrink wrap” cases in a discussion of Hill v. Gateway.154
Maxim seven requires the court to look at intent rather than form in
making a decision regarding whether to order the parties to specifically
perform. This Maxim provides a nice bridge between the first six Maxims
which appear to favor the consumer, and the last five Maxims which appear
to favor the business community. The intent of the consumer may have been
to preserve the right to a jury trial, whereas the intent of the business may
have been to avoid a jury trial at all cost. Therefore, Maxim seven seems to
“cut” from both sides of the proverbial “card deck”, and it stacks an equal
number of “cards” on each side. If there was no clear intent by the
152

Id. at 228.
Hill v. Gateway, 105 F. 3d 1147 (1997)
154
Id.
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consumer to accept the arbitration agreement, perhaps mutuality is lacking.
On the other hand, if a consumer accepted the term proposed by the
business, then the consumer should be held to the contractual terms.
Unfortunately, the federal courts are not so well versed on Maxim seven,
and have held that arbitration agreements are not invalid due to lack of
mutuality.155
The Equity Maxims eight through twelve are an integral part of many
arbitration decisions in favor of specific performance. These decisions
require contract enforcement by the persons involved based upon the law
(FAA) and with a view toward fulfillment of the parties obligations to each
other under the contract.
LESSONS LEARNED FROM GILMER v. INTERSTATE/JOHNSON
LANE CORP.
Although statutory claims could presumably be ordered to arbitration
after Shearsonin 1987, it was generally assumed civil rights claims could
not be arbitrated. The 1991 case of Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane
Corp.,156 held that civil rights claims can be ordered to arbitration. The trial
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RAASCH Supra, FN 149.
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Plaintiff contended his ADEA claim was
not subject to arbitration. However, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the securities agreement signed by
plaintiff could subject plaintiff to compulsory arbitration. The Supreme Court held that age
discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant to arbitration agreement in securities
registration application.
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court in Gilmer denied arbitration based upon the Alexander v. GardnerDenver157 case decided by the U.S. Supreme Court some seventeen years
earlier. The area of civil rights was thought to be different from other
statutory claims prior to Gilmer. The Gilmer case eliminated some of the
last bastions of resistance to arbitration in two areas: Civil rights and
employment claims. Prior to Gilmer most courts treated employment claims
as non-arbitrable due to the language of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Following Gilmer a rise occurred in the number of arbitration clauses
inserted in employment contracts. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105 (2001), held employment contracts to be subject to the FAA.
In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a general arbitration clause
in a collective bargaining agreement did not require a union member to

Arbitration of registered securities representative’s age discrimination claim was not inadequate,
despite representative’s contention that arbitration procedures did not provide for broad equitable relief
and class actions, inasmuch as arbitrators had power to fashion equitable relief.
Gilmer is bound by his agreement to arbitrate unless he can show an inherent conflict between
arbitration and the ADEA’s underlying purposes.
The unequal bargaining power between employers and employees is not a sufficient reason to hold
that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context.
“[B] y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded
by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”
The burden is on Gilmer to show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of a judicial forum for
ADEA claims.
157
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Prior to Gilmer, this case was interpreted as
prohibiting compulsory arbitration of civil rights claims.
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arbitrate a disability claim.158 The high court refused to compel an employee
to forego litigation of an American with Disabilities Act claim as a result of
being a union member.159 EEOC v. Waffle House160 allowed the EEOC to
proceed outside arbitration, even though the employee of Waffle House was
bound by the arbitration agreement. Gilmer served notice that there are no
“sacred cows” in enforcement of arbitration agreements. Arbitration can be
enforced under the FAA without contravening federal civil rights antidiscrimination policies or violating employees rights.161
HILL v. GATEWAY:
While attorneys and judges were still pondering the long reaching
effects of Gilmer, a new case came along that opened a Pandora’s Box in
this area of law. Federal courts ruled that parties may be held to binding
arbitration agreements they have signed (Southland v. Keating) and
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Wright v. Universal Marine Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998) Wright was a longshoreman and was a
member of a union. Wright filed an action against Universal Marine when it refused to employ him after
he settled a disability claim. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice because Wright failed to
pursue arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. The U.S. Supreme held that the collective
bargaining agreement did not force Wright to arbitrate his ADA claim. The court held that “in order for
a union to waive employee’s rights to a judicial forum for statutory claims, the agreement to arbitrate
must clear and unmistakable.”
159
Id.
160
EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2000) Employment agreement selecting arbitration as forum for
resolution of disputes does not bar EEOC from pursuing victim – specific judicial relief based upon
allegations of a violation of Americans with Disabilities Act. Binding arbitration agreement between
employee and employer does not bind EEOC.
161
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) Arbitration agreements can be enforced under
the FAA without contravening federal anti-discrimination policies. The 9th Circuit had held that all
employment contracts are beyond the reach of the FAA. The U.S. Supreme Court held that only
transportation workers are exempt from the FAA. There fore, employment agreements are subject to the
FAA. Reversed and remanded with directions to compel arbitration.
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arbitration agreements contained in contracts under which they sought relief
(Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson), however, following Hill v. Gateway162
held that parties may also be ordered to specifically perform on arbitration
agreements contained in shipping documents they have not signed.163 In the
Hill v. Gateway case, parties were held to have waived their right to litigate
a warranty claim by presumed assent to an arbitration agreement contained
in shrink wrap inside a shipping container.164
Gateway did not receive acceptance in all federal courts. A Kansas
federal court held that Gateway’s shrink-wrap “documents in the box
approach” was not part of the original agreement, but rather constituted
additional terms to which the customer as a consumer had not consented.165
Legal scholars have criticized the holding in Hill v. Gateway because it
appears to allow businesses to hide arbitration agreements in a group of
shrink wrap documents and force customers to search for the pre-dispute
162

Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Circ. 1997).
Circuit Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in this case seemed to cross a mythical line for some consumer
advocates. An arbitration agreement was sent in a set of packing documents inside a computer box, and
was held to be binding upon the consumers who accepted the box and the documents and elected not to
return the computer. According to the Gateway opinion, the failure to return the computer resulted in an
acceptance of the terms contained in the box, including the arbitration agreement.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F.Supp. 2d 1332 (2000).
Klocek, a Missouri resident, purchased a Gateway computer. Inside the Gateway computer box was
a copy of Gateway’s “Standard Terms and Conditions Agreement.” Although there was some
disagreement between Gateway and Klocek over how he obtained the computer, when a dispute arose
between Gateway and Klocek, Gateway endeavored to enforce the arbitration agreement. When Klocek
filed suit against Gateway, Gateway moved the court to compel arbitration. The court found that
Gateway’s Standard Terms and Condition’s Agreement were not part of the original transaction between
Gateway and Klocek, but were additional terms as contemplated by the UCC. The Klocek court rejected
the Hill v. Gateway shrink-wrap case logic and refused to dismiss the Klocek case.
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waiver or suffer the consequences.166 According to one scholar quoted in a
newspaper article the Supreme Court rewrote the FAA “as a service to
corporations that don’t like jury trials.”167
Some plaintiff attorneys complain vigorously that the cost of arbitration
is prohibitive for enforcement of rights, but this argument has not been
sustained in any case, including Hill v. Gateway, where it was shown that
the consumer would have to pay almost triple the amount of the product
purchased in order to arbitrate a warranty claim.168 However, the Klocek
case examined the financial status of the consumer as opposed to the
financial status of a business entity when dealing with arbitration
agreements. Klocek v. Gateway,169 held that a consumer could not be held
subject to the same standards as a business.
In many regrets, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Hill v. Gateway is
difficult to understand. Judge Easterbrook cited insurance and other
businesses that operate on the buy now, terms later plan, but he failed to
explain Gateway’s limited return policy.170 The Seventh Circuit assumed
166

Jean R. Sternlight, Gateway Widens Doorway to Imposing Unfair Binding Arbitration on Consumers,
FLA. BAR JOURNAL, November 1997.
167
Reynolds Holding, Private Justice: Millions are losing their Legal Rights, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, October 7, 2001. The author quoted Professor Paul Harrington’s comment about the
Supreme Court and the FAA.
168
Green Tree Financial v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). The cost argument was made but the Supreme
Court declined to respond to it because no proof of cost was contained in the record.
169
Klocek. Supra, FN 165.
170
Id. The court ruled that the Hills had thirty days from receipt of the computer to return the computer, but
this ruling seems to be difficult to understand in light of Gateway’s return policy of thirty days from date
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the Gateway return policy was valid for thirty days from the Hill’s receipt of
the computer, but Gateway’s actual language limited the return period to
thirty days from date of shipment. The “acceptance” period could vary from
as much as three weeks under average shipping conditions, to an expired
return policy upon arrival if a substantial delay occurred during shipping.
The Hills could have been placed in the unique situation of returning a
product under the return policy upon receipt, even though the return period
on that product had expired before they gained possession of the computer
or the arbitration agreement. How could a customer demand specific
performance in arbitration under terms that had expired before the customer
received the product?
Many of the criticisms of Hill v. Gateway focus on the Seventh
Circuit’s alleged accommodating attitude toward businesses at the expense
of consumers.171 However, if the Gateway return policy on the computer
had already expired when the Hills brought their claims in federal court, why
would the result be unfair to Gateway or to the Hills?172 The court would
simply be enforcing the terms of Gateway’s return policy. A computer
of shipment. Under Judge Easterbrook’s reasoning the Hills would have enjoyed thirty days in which to
return the computer, but they may have received a computer that was out of warranty when it arrived.
171
Richard G. Kunkel, Recent Developments in Shrink Wrap, Clickwrap and Browsewrap Licenses in The
United States, 9 MURDOCK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF LAW 3, 19 (2002).
172
See Gateway Service Plan, Supra FN 167. Reynolds Holding, Private Justice: Millions are losing their
Legal Rights, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, October 7, 2001. The author quoted Professor Paul
Harrington’s comment about the Supreme Court and the FAA.
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manufacturer, and likely other businesses as well, do not exist to
accommodate customers at every turn to the detriment of their stockholders.
Customers are free to “vote” for or against products with their ability to
purchase from competitors that utilize less restrictive terms. The Hill v.
Gateway case is but one case in a line of cases often cited by pro-consumer
groups as indicative of the trampling of consumer rights by a judicial
system, which favors business.173 However, it is probably the best, or
perhaps worst, example of a federal court enforcing an agreement for
specific performance to arbitrate through presumptive assent and laches,
while ignoring the equity Maxims of fairness that accompany specific
performance.
DEFENSES TO BINDING PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS:
There are two categories of defenses to arbitration: Pre-arbitration
hearing defenses and post-arbitration hearing defenses. There are a number
of defenses that have been successful in either stopping the arbitration
process before it starts or setting aside the results. There have also been a
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Reynolds Holding, Private Justice: Millions are Losing Their Legal Rights, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, October 7, 2001. Quoting Montana Supreme Court Justice Terry Trieweiler, the article
states “Mandatory arbitration allows corporations to undermine the whole system by which we hold them
accountable. Every day it becomes more pervasive and more oppressive.” The author adds “A private
brand of civil justice, one without laws or juries or constitutional rights, has swept quietly across the
nation’s commercial landscapes, shielding corporations from costly verdicts, compromising judges and
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number of defenses in both categories that have failed to either stop the
process or overturn the arbitrator’s award. In general, there are very few
effective defenses to specific performance in arbitration that work
consistently, either before or after the hearing.
Pre-hearing defenses that have worked successfully in some cases
include the entire contract, including the arbitration clause was void ab
initio.174 The theory is that if there is no contract for arbitration from the
outset, there can be no agreement to arbitrate. However, because courts now
view the arbitration agreement as a separate contract under the separability
doctrine, the effectiveness of this argument is limited to situations where
both the container contract and the arbitration agreement were void from the
outset. A closely related defense to “no contract” is “no arbitration clause”
applicable to the party seeking to avoid the arbitration.175 This defense has
been used successfully when some of the parties agreed to arbitrate, while
others did not agree to waive their litigation rights.
174

National Auction Group, Inc. v. Hammett, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1012145, January 31,
2003.
Homeowner purchased condominium at an auction. The homeowner’s problems with the Auction
Group could not be resolved, and the homeowner sued the Auction Group for fraud and negligence in the
sale of the condominium. The Auction Group moved to compel arbitration via an arbitration agreement
signed by condominium owner’s association. The homeowner was not a signatory to that agreement and
the court held the homeowner could not be bound by it.
175
Johnson Mobile Homes v. Hathcock, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1992310, February 21, 2003.
This mobile home fraud, negligence and bad faith case was filed in a circuit court, which denied the
seller’s motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court of Alabama found no allegation of fraud
against the arbitration clause, but an allegation of fraud in the procurement of the container contract. The
seller was within its rights to compel arbitration against the buyer who signed the arbitration agreement.
The co-purchaser who did not sign the arbitration agreement was not compelled to arbitrate. Fraud in the
inducement of the container contract is arbitrable.
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Arbitration agreements have also been set aside when they were
unilaterally given by one party and there is no evidence the other party
assented to arbitrate.176 Fraud in the procurement of the contract as a whole
will not render the contract non-arbitrable, but allegations of fraud in the
procurement of the arbitration agreement must be litigated.177 If the terms of
the contract are unconscionable, the courts may deny a motion to compel
specific performance of the arbitration agreement.178 If the contract and
arbitration rules in the arbitration clause result in a rigged process, the court
may refuse to compel arbitration.179
One of the oldest contract principles is a meeting of the minds. Mutual
assent to terms is generally required to form a valid contract. This has been a
well-understood principle of contract law for centuries. For a contract to be
valid and enforceable there must be assent in writing, if significant amounts
of money or property are involved. However, in recent arbitration cases
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Bodie v. Bank of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Cali. App. 1998) Credit card customers held not to
consent to envelope stuffers containing arbitration agreement.
177
Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (1997). Court ruled that HMO patient
detrimentally relied on HMO’s arbitration agreement after HMO made misrepresentations about its
arbitration process.
178
Sears Termite & Pest Control v. Robinson, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 102034, May 23, 2003.
The trial court denied Sears motion to compel arbitration because the Sears contract limited the
homeowner’s damages in arbitration and was, therefore, unconscionable. The Alabama Supreme court
held that limitation of damages language does not render an arbitration clause unenforceable. Although
the homeowner contended that her signature on the first page of the contract was insufficient to bind her
the arbitration clause printed in a different section of the contract, the court held the homeowner’s
signature on the contract was sufficient to bind her to all of its terms.
179
Hooters of America v. Phillips, 173 F. 3d 933 (1999). Sexual harassment case against restaurant chain
was not sent to arbitration because restaurant’s procedure was biased in favor of restaurant.
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mutual assent has been found in a variety of ways, and is not limited to the
traditional views of mutual assent.
Some defenses to specific performance do not seem to work at all
against arbitration, while others do not work well.180 Courts do not provide
protections for the unwary, but do attempt to enforce arbitration clauses to
specifically perform in spite of legal contract defenses.181 Unconscionability
and other fairness defenses to contracts are often difficult to prove.182 If the
parties agree to arbitrate, they are likely to be held to their bargain.183 Courts
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See HILL Supra, FN 153.
Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory
Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1040-1047 (1998) See FN 9.
182
Potts v. Baptist Health System, Inc., Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1011234, Dec. 20, 2002.
Nurse filed action against medical center for breach of contract, defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and wrongful termination. Circuit Court, granted center’s motion
to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court, held that: (1) Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted state
statute prohibiting enforcement of agreement to submit controversy to arbitration, and (2) circumstances
surrounding signing of arbitration agreement did not render agreement unconscionable.
Affirmed.
183
Board of Ed. Of Berkeley County v. W. Harley Miller, Inc. 236 S.E.2d 439 (W.Va. 1977)
The Circuit Court refused to grant motion for summary judgment to enforce award of arbitrators, on
ground it lacked jurisdiction, and certified jurisdictional question to the Supreme Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court of Appeals, held that: (1) where parties to a contract agree to arbitrate either all disputes
or particular limited disputes arising under the contract and where the parties bargained for the arbitration
provision, arbitration is mandatory and specifically enforceable on motion for summary judgment, and
any causes of action arising under the contract which by the contract terms are made arbitrable are
merged, in the absence of fraud, with the arbitration award; (2) arbitration agreement is not “bargained
for,” so as to be binding and specifically enforceable, in the contract of adhesion situation, or where a
party can bring arbitration clause within the unconscionability provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, or where arbitration is wholly inappropriate given the nature of the contract and could only have
been intended to defeat just claims, and (3) arbitration provision in contract between board of education
and contractor for excavation and removal of rock was specifically enforceable despite contention of
board that law of arbitration in West Virginia at time it entered into the contract was such as to make the
whole procedure of arbitration a nullity. This is the infamous “rabbits”, and “wolves” case, where the
Supreme Court of Appeals used an animal analogy to support its reasoning in the opinion. “Wolves”
vote with “wolves” and “rabbits” vote with “rabbits”, but the other animals must be analyzed as to their
relationship.
One might conclude that squirrels look like rabbits, wolves look like foxes, and elephants ought
surely to be impartial.
181
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can ill afford to spend the time necessary to craft individual relief for each
aggrieved party in a contract. The theory of specific performance in
arbitration has been appealing to modern judges who are overworked, but at
least in some measure it should appeal to litigants who must wait years in
the long lines at the courthouse to obtain justice.184
If a party states they failed to read the contractual terms prior to
signing, their inattention does not provide a sufficient ground for setting
aside an agreement to arbitrate.185 Lack of consideration for the arbitration
clause is usually a losing defense, because most courts have gone out of their
way to find implied consideration to support the agreement to arbitrate.186
The contracts of adhesion defense does not work unless there is

As soon as the law attempts to incorporate protections for the unwary in the law of arbitration, then
the entire purpose of arbitration is defeated. In the hypothetical above, this is the case where the rabbits
plead “wolfery” and demand a hearing with full-blown court proceedings, thus avoiding speedy,
economical, conflict resolution.
184
See HAAGEN, Supra, FN 181.
185
Tindler v. Pinkerton Security, 305 f. 728 (2002)
Title VII, Employer moved to stay trial proceedings and compel arbitration of dispute. Employee’s
affidavit that she never saw brochure introducing binding arbitration program did not raise triable issue
of fact as to existence of agreement to arbitrate that would preclude compelled arbitration.
Employer’s promise to continue employing an at-will employee could constitute consideration for an
employee’s promise to forego certain rights.
186
RAASCH v. NCR Corporation, 254 F.Supp.2d 847 (2003)
On employer’s motion to dismiss action and compel arbitration, the District Court, held that: (1)
arbitration agreement between the parties was not invalid for lack of mutuality of obligations; (2) feesplitting provision in arbitration agreement, which required employee to pay upfront half the costs of
arbitration of disputes with employer, was not unconscionable under Ohio law; (3) employer’s promise to
continue employing at-will employee, and its promise to be bound by terms of arbitration agreement, in
return for employee’s consideration for agreement; (4) employee’s act of continuing to work for
employer after employer stated that his doing so would constitute acceptance of arbitration agreement,
demonstrated employee’s assent to, or acceptance of, terms, and thus agreement was not invalid or
revocable for lack of acceptance; and (5) arbitration agreement was not invalid contract of adhesion.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that as long as an arbitral forum is provided for vindicating
statutory rights, there is no moment that the right to vindicate same in a court has been denied.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration. SUSTAINED.
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accompanying unconscionability.187 The reasonable expectations of the
parties has worked in some cases, but not in others to set aside the agreement
to arbitrate.188 Lack of assent often fails to set aside an agreement to
arbitrate, because courts usually find assent by the parties’ actions.189
Post-Hearing defenses are even more limited than pre-hearing defenses.
The Federal Arbitration Act provides four grounds upon which an
arbitrator’s award may be vacated by a court.190 The grounds are as follows:
1.

The award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means.

2.

Where there was evident partiality or conduct in the arbitrators.

3.

Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the arbitration hearing, or refusing to hear material
evidence at the hearing or other violations of parties’ rights.
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Torrance v. Aames Funding Corporation, 242f.Supp.2d 862 (2002)
Limitation on damages for UTPA claim would be unconscionable; confidentiality clause would be
unconscionable; arbitration agreement would be unconscionable due to requirement that mortgagors pay
arbitrator fees; and unconscionable provisions were nonseverable from arbitration agreement.
Defendant argues that the limitation on damages is enforceable because it applies to both parties.
Requiring payment of arbitrator’s fees, as opposed to reasonable costs, is not permitted as a condition of
arbitration. Although the Agreement to Arbitrate permits plaintiffs to recoup those fees should they
prevail, those fees should not be borne by plaintiffs even if they lose, just as a party is not required to pay
for the services of the judge regardless of the outcome in court.
188
Broemmer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, LTD 840 P. 2d 1013 (1992).
189
Lewis Tree Service, Inc. v. Lucent Technologies Inc., 239 F.Supp.2d 332 (2002)
On defendant’s motion to compel arbitration with one purchaser, the District Court, held that: (1)
arbitration clause in purchase agreement between sellers and purchaser was enforceable with respect to
purchaser’s claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (NJCFA); (2) arbitration clause was
enforceable with respect to all remaining claims, absent showing that purchaser signed agreement under
circumstances creating unenforceable contract of adhesion; and (3) where all of the purchaser’s claims
were arbitrable, dismissal of its action, rather than stay, was warranted.
Motion granted.
Because Ironman has not demonstrated that the Purchase Agreement was signed under
circumstances creating an unenforceable contract of adhesion, the provision requiring all of Ironman’s
claims to be arbitrated is enforceable.
190
9 U.S.C. 10
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4.

Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers.

An arbitration award may be modified on the following grounds:191
1.

Evident mistake in the description of anything referred to in the
award including a material miscalculation of figures.

2.

The arbitrators ruled on a matter not submitted to them.

3.

The award is imperfect and does not address the merits of the
controversy.

The essence of these defenses is that unless the award is either illegal or
the arbitrators engaged in misconduct the award will be affirmed. Charges
of the award is not fair, the award is not well reasoned or the award contains
a few minor errors are all insufficient grounds upon which to set aside an
award. Arbitrators are not required to follow the letter of law in crafting
their awards.192 They are not required to be logical or fair.193
One post-award defense finding a good home in some states is the
manifest disregard of the law as a ground for vacating an arbitral award.194 A
decision made by arbitrators who ignored the law can result in an award that
harms the parties’ rights, rather than protecting those rights. Although the
Federal Arbitration Act does not specifically list manifest disregard of the
191

9 U.S.C. 11
Greenberg v. Bear, Sterns & Co., 220 F.3d 22 (2000).
193
Id.
194
Montes v. Shearson Lechman Brothers, 128 F.3d 1456 (11th Cir. 1997) Arbitrator was urged by one
party to disregard the law.
192
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law as a ground for vacatur, it does hint at the idea in the first ground under
undue means.195 Federal courts have allowed this ground, but have limited
the use of this defense.196
Arbitrator bias has shown some promise as a post-hearing defense.
Alabama courts use a reasonable impression of partiality standard to review
awards for bias by the arbitrators.197 However, courts are only willing to set
aside awards for partiality of the arbitrators when the facts make that
partiality clear.198 Arbitrators are required to disclose prior conflicts of
interest.199 Courts avoid creating protections for the unwary and finding bias
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9 U.S.C. 10
John W. Hinchey and Thomas Burch, Georgia Adopts “Manifest Disregard” as a Ground for Vacating
Arbitration Awards, 9 GA. Bar JOURNAL 11, 14, 16 (February 2004). Georgia became the first state to
statutorily adopt manifest disregard of law standard for vacatur of arbitration awards. However, federal
courts have placed restrictions on the use of this defense and cases where manifest disregard is alleged
may require significant proof the arbitrator knew the law and ignored it.
197
Waverlee Homes v. McMichael, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010966, February 14, 2003.
Mobile home buyers signed arbitration agreement with mobile home seller. Mobile home buyers
brought action against seller for fraud. Trial court ordered the case to arbitration, and the arbitrator
entered an award in favor of buyers. The trial court entered the arbitrator’s award as the judgment in the
case and denied seller’s motion to set aside the award on ground of bias of the arbitrator. There was
evidence that the arbitrator had been co-counsel with buyer’s attorney on a prior case and had made
similar rulings in favor of the clients of the former co-counsel in other cases. The Supreme Court held
this evidence was sufficient to support an inference of bias and that the trial court should have used
reasonable impression of partiality standard on review of the award. The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded with directions.
198
Forsy International v. Gibbs Oil Company, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (1990)
If an arbitrator’s decision rests on an adequate basis, the failure of the arbitrator to address all the
issues raised does not render the arbitration fundamentally unfair. The arbitrator is not bound to hear all
of the evidence tendered by the parties before rendering award. The grounds for vacatur are narrow.
199
Refining ad Marketing Company v. Stratheros Shipping of Monrovia,761 F. Supp. 293 (1991)
Arbitrators must make full disclosure of possible conflicts of interest. A party asserting evident
partiality by an arbitrator has the burden of showing that a reasonable person would conclude the
arbitrator was biased to one party.
Crow Construction Company v. Jeffrey Brown Assoc., 2003 WL 21221021 (ED. Pa)
Appearance of bias rather than actual bias is the standard to be applied to vacating an award based
upon alleged bias of the arbitrator. Arbitrator failed to disclose prior contact with one of the parties and
appearance of bias was found.
196
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in every practice by arbitrators.200 California has recently enacted
requirements that arbitrators disclose their prior dealings with either party to
an arbitration.201
Many lawyers assert the defense of unconscionable contract in response
to contracts of adhesion. However, all contracts of adhesion are not
unconscionable, but to be deemed unconscionable the contract must contain
elements of harshness and oppression or inadequate consideration.202 The
uniform commercial code recognizes two types of unconscionability in UCC
2-302.203 The two types listed in the UCC are procedural unconscionability

200

Board of Ed. Of Berkeley County v. W. Harley Miller, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 439 (W.Va. 1977)
The Circuit Court refused to grant motion for summary judgment to enforce award of arbitrators, on
ground it lacked jurisdiction, and certified jurisdictional question to the Supreme Court of Appeals. The
Supreme Court of Appeals, held that: (1) where parties to a contract agree to arbitrate either all disputes
or particular limited disputes arising under the contract and where the parties bargained for the arbitration
provision, arbitration is mandatory and specifically enforceable on motion for summary judgment, and
any causes of action arising under the contract which by the contract terms are made arbitrable are
merged, in the absence of fraud, with the arbitration award; (2) arbitration agreement is not “bargained
for,” so as to be binding and specifically enforceable, in the contract of adhesion situation, or where a
party can bring arbitration clause within the unconscionability provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, or where arbitration is wholly inappropriate given the nature of the contract and could only have
been intended to defeat just claims, and (3) arbitration provision in contract between board of education
and contractor for excavation and removal of rock was specifically enforceable despite contention of
board that law of arbitration in West Virginia at time it entered into the contract was such as to make the
whole procedure of arbitration a nullity. This is the infamous “rabbits”, and “wolves” case, where the
Supreme Court of Appeals used an animal analogy to support its reasoning in the opinion. “Wolves”
vote with “wolves” and “rabbits” vote with rabbits, but the other animals must be analyzed as to their
relationship.
One might conclude that squirrels look like rabbits, wolves look like foxes, and elephants ought
surely to be impartial.
As soon as the law attempts to incorporate protections for the unwary in the law of arbitration, then
the entire purpose of arbitration is defeated. In the hypothetical above, this is the case where the rabbits
plead “wolfery” and demand a hearing with full-blown court proceedings, thus avoiding speedy,
economical, conflict resolution.
201
Cal. Civil Proc. Code 1281.9 requires arbitrators to disclose the arbitrator’s experience over the past five
years including parties’ names and damages awarded.
202
Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, WEST PUBLISHING, St. Paul (1952)
203
Joseph D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perrillo, Contracts, WEST GROUP, St. Paul (1999), p 330, 331
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and substantive unconscionability.204 Procedural unconscionability is
described as unfair surprise, where reasonable people would not expect to
find unfair terms in the fine print.205 The second type of unconscionability is
described as oppression or a contract being unfairly balanced toward one
side.206 The case of Broemer v. Abortion Service of Phoenix207 would be an
example of procedural unconscionability, whereas the Hooters v. Phillips208
case would be an example of substantive unconscionability. There is a third
type of unconscionability which can be drawn from case law, and that is an
agreement that contains both surprise and oppression.209 Such a case might
be Engalla v. Permanente,210 here both the procedural and substantive
elements of unconscionability are combined in one case. The plaintiff
alleged fraud, an unfair process and a rigged process to guarantee abnormal
delays. Engalla’s Kaiser HMO required him to abide by an arbitration
agreement when he disputed Kaiser’s handling of his cancer treatment. The
Kaiser contract contained numerous procedural “hoops”, but the purpose of
these “hoops” appeared to be delay. Kaiser’s contract was so heavily
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Id. at 331.
Id.
206
Id.
207
Broemer v. Abortion Services of Phoenix, 840, p. 2d 1013 (1992)
208
Hooters of America v. Phillips, 173 F. 3d 933 (1999)
209
See Calmari & Perillo, Supra, FN 203.
210
Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, 938 p. 2d 903 (1997)
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weighed in favor of the HMO, Engalla died while endeavoring to comply
with Kaiser’s procedures.
In order for the defense of fraud to work, it must be asserted against the
making of the arbitration agreement, and not merely the container contract.
The Engalla v. Permanente211 court also set aside the arbitration agreement
on the basis of fraud. Not only did the defendant in Engalla attempt to hold
the plaintiff to an unconscionable contract, the court held the defendant
fraudulently represented the terms of the contract regarding the arbitration
clause.212 The defendant’s self-administered arbitration process rigged the
process in favor of the defendant.213 Therefore, if an arbitration plaintiff can
prove the defendant defrauded the plaintiff in the formation of the agreement
by misrepresenting the facts or in the process by placing the plaintiff at a
disadvantage, the plaintiff has a decent chance of setting aside the arbitration
agreement.
The defense of concealment is the sin of knowing omission rather than
commission. Rather than actively misrepresenting a major point upon which
the aggrieved party detrimentally relied, concealment involves leaving out

211

Id.
Id.
213
Id.
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pertinent facts which should have been disclosed. If too many facts are
omitted, then the contract to arbitrate may not be valid and enforceable.214
One-sided obligations in contract language are the basis for the defense
of inadequacy of consideration. If the parties do not agree to mutually
resolve their disputes through the arbitration process, and one side is free to
pursue litigation, the arbitration clause will likely fail due to inadequacy of
consideration.215 In such circumstances, consideration will not be implied
from the conduct of the parties.
Although laches has proven to be a good defense to the specific
enforcement of “stale” contracts, it has not gained wide acceptance in the
field of arbitration law. Parties have been able to exercise their rights to
demand arbitration in the middle of litigation, regardless of the laches
defense. Laches was actually used against the plaintiff in the Hill Gateway
case.216
CREATIVE STATE LAW DEFENSES TO PRE-DISPUTE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:
Alabama provides the best example for creative state law defenses to
pre-dispute arbitration agreements mandating specific performance.
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Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas v. Amoco Oil Co., 573 F. Supp. 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc. 121 F3d 1126 (1997).
216
See Hill, Supra, FN 153.
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Alabama Code Section 8-1-41(3) forbids specific performance of predispute arbitration clauses in Alabama contracts. Thus, Alabama’s public
policy is anti-pre-dispute arbitration. Prior to Terminex,217 the courts in
Alabama understood that interstate contracts were subject to the mandates of
the FAA.218 Alabama’s Supreme Court used a much narrower interpretation
than the federal courts of the phrase “a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce.”219 In Alabama, “involving commerce” meant having
a substantial impact on interstate commerce.220 The Alabama public policy
against specific performance of pre-dispute arbitration clauses was not
effectively eradicated by the United States Supreme Court decision in
Terminex.221 The Alabama Supreme Court continued to look for a way to
revive the limitations of Ala. Code 8-1-41 (3) and five years post-Terminex
they discovered it. In 2000, the Alabama Supreme Court examined the
United States Supreme Court holding in United States v. Lopez,222 a criminal
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Terminex, Supra FN 116.
Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 644 So. 2d 1258 (Ala. 1994)
219
Terminex, Supra FN 116.
220
Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson, 628 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1994)
221
Terminex, Supra, FN 116.
222
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
This criminal case actually had an impact on Alabama arbitration cases. The Supreme Court held
that the Commerce Clause is not without limitations, and that making it a federal crime to possess a
firearm in a local gun free school zone under the Gun-Free School Zone Act exceeded Congress’
Commerce Clause authority. The language used in the opinion indicated the test for determining whether
an activity falls under Congress’ power to regulate commerce is whether the activity substantially affects
commerce. The Supreme Court of Alabama used the language in Lopez to construct a prong test in
Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Company, 775 So.2d 759 2000. The U.S. Supreme Court
in Citizen’s Bank v. ALAFABCO, 539 U.S. 52, 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003), specifically disapproved of the
218
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case, and used the certain parts of Lopez to craft a five-prong test for specific
performance of arbitration in Alabama. The Alabama Supreme Court
opinion in Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co.223 represented
a high water mark for creativeness by Alabama’s highest court.
The Alabama Supreme Court used Lopez language about the Commerce
Clause as a springboard, but used its own narrow definition of interstate
commerce to create its test.224 The Sisters of the Visitation opinion was an
immediate success in Alabama, because it revived Alabama’s comatose
public policy against pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Cases which could
overcome the five-prong test hurdle, were ordered to arbitration under the

Alabama Supreme Court’s use of Lopez to construct the Sister’s tests, calling the Alabama Court’s
efforts “misguided.”
223
Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co., 775 So. 2d 759 (2000). A Mobile, Alabama,
monastery engaged a Mobile plastering company to perform repairs on the wall and ceiling of the
monastery’s chapel. The repair work did not go as anticipated and allegedly resulted in damage to the
ceiling’s decorative paintings. The monastery demanded arbitration under its contract with Cochran, and
Cochran sued the monastery for an injunction to stop the arbitration. The United States Supreme Court
in the United States v. Lopez, (see previous footnote) ruled that Congress’ commerce power was not
unlimited. The Alabama used that case to develop a five prong test to determine whether a set of case
facts have a substantial impact on interstate commerce. The tests were:
1.
Citizenship of Parties;
2.
Tools and equipment used on the project;
3.
Allocation of costs and materials;
4.
Subsequent movement across state lines; and
5.
Degree of separability from other contracts.
The Alabama court found the parties were citizens of Alabama, no substantial effect on interstate
commerce resulted from the purchase and use of the tools and equipment by Cochran, no out of state
workers or materials were used by Cochran, nothing subsequently moved across state lines because the
work site was fixed in Alabama, and the monastery’s other contracts with out of state residents were
separable from the contract with Cochran. For those reasons, the Alabama Supreme Court elected to
enforce Ala. Code 8-1-41(3) and prohibit enforcement of the arbitration agreement. This case created
two streams of cases in Alabama. One stream affirmed arbitration under the FAA, and the other stream
denied arbitration under Ala. Code 8-1-41(3). The Sisters five-prong test was used to determine whether
the case was arbitrated or litigated. In the summer of 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the
Sisters five prong test in Citizen’s Bank v. Alafabco, 123 S.ct. 2037 (2003).
224
Id.
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authority of the Federal Arbitration Act, while the cases which failed the
five-prong hurdle test, remained in litigation under Ala. Code 8-1-41(3).225
Sisters created two streams of Alabama arbitration cases: one stream
allegedly involved strictly state law matters that did not “substantially”
impact interstate commerce and were governed by Ala. Code 8-1-41(3)
while the other stream involved cases with significant interstate commerce
contracts that “affected” commerce, were governed by the FAA and were
ordered to arbitration.226 Alabama plaintiffs who could demonstrate that all
five hurdles were not met were allowed to litigate. Defendants who could
get over all five hurdles imposed by Sisters of the Visitation were allowed to
obtain an order for specific performance of arbitration.
There is a long list of cases on both sides of the Sisters opinion, but a
few are included in this article to demonstrate how the Alabama courts used
their own interpretation of “affecting” commerce. The Alabama case of
Huntsville Utilities v. Consolidated Construction Company227 resulted in a
225

Id.
Id.
227
Huntsville Utilities v. Consolidated Construction Company, Supreme Court of Alabama, May 23, 2003.
A Delaware general contractor subcontracted a roofing project in Huntsville, Alabama to a
Tennessee contractor doing business in Alabama. The Tennessee contractor subcontracted the work to
an Alabama contractor. Huntsville Utilities was sued by the general contractor for non-payment,
negligence, fraud and a variety of other allegations. Huntsville Utilities moved to compel arbitration.
The trial court denied the motion holding only Alabama transactions were involved. The Supreme Court
of Alabama affirmed using the prong test set out in Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering
Company, 775 So. 2d 759 (2000). Justice See dissented, and the language of his dissent in this case
bears a close resemblance to the opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Citizens Bank v.
ALAFABCO, 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003). Justice See opined that the Alabama Supreme Court erred in the
226
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denial of arbitration, while the Alabama case of Parkway Dodge v.
Hawkins228 resulted in an order to arbitrate. In some instances, the fiveprong hurdle test was not applied due to the nature of the case. For example,
Health Insurance Corporation of Alabama v. Smith229 by-passed the Sisters
prong test because an insurance policy issued in another state obviously
passed over all the hurdles and involved interstate commerce. Sears Termite
& Pest Control v. Robinson230 avoided the Sisters test, because it was
decided by declaring the contract unconscionable based upon a limitation of
damages clause. National Auction Group, Inc. v. Hammett231 was decided by

Sisters opinion by imposing a narrow view of involving interstate commerce contrary to the broader view
of affecting commerce set forth in Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson 513 U.S. 265 (1995). This case was
effectively overturned by ALAFABCO which overturned Sisters.
228
Parkway Dodge v. Hawkins, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010898, February 7, 2003.
Car buyer brought action against car dealer for suppression and misrepresentation regarding sales
transaction containing arbitration agreement, credit life insurance and a service contract. The car dealer
moved to compel arbitration and the trial court granted the motion. Supreme Court held that car buyers
purchase of out of state insurance and a service contract with an out of state company were sufficient
interstate commerce contracts under the FAA. The arbitration agreement arose from the same transaction
and could not be treated as a separate contract involving only Alabama law.
229
Health Insurance Corporation of Alabama v. Smith, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010570,
April 11, 2003.
Reversing the trial court’s denial of motion to compel arbitration of a fraud action based on
insurance policies, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the sale of insurance policies substantially
affects interstate commerce. The court held that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in an insurance
policy is enforceable under the FAA even thought the policy holders purchased the policies from an instate insurance agency. The policies were issued in Washington and mailed to the Alabama policyholders. This opinion by Justice See marked a departure for the Alabama Supreme Court from the
analysis previously used in Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Company 775 So. 2d 759
(2000).
230
Sears Termite & Pest Control v. Robinson, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 102034, May 23, 2003.
The trial court denied Sears motion to compel arbitration because the Sears contract limited the
homeowner’s damages in arbitration and was, therefore, unconscionable. The Alabama Supreme court
held that limitation of damages language does not render an arbitration clause unenforceable. Although
the homeowner contended that her signature on the first page of the contract was insufficient to bind her
the arbitration clause printed in a different section of the contract, the court held the homeowner’s
signature on the contract was sufficient to bind her to all of its terms.
231
National Auction Group, Inc. v. Hammett, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1012145, January 31,
2003.
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ordinary contract law (privity) and it was not necessary to apply the Sisters
prong test. McDonald v. H & S Homes, LLC and Olympia232 turned on the
trial court’s substitution of AAA rules for the agreed upon rules in the
parties contract. Some Alabama cases that had been ordered to arbitration
were later set-aside on grounds of bias of the arbitrators,233 while other
Alabama opinions clarified trial court orders that were somewhat
ambiguous.234

Homeowner purchased condominium at an auction. The homeowner’s problems with the Auction
Group could not be resolved, and the homeowner sued the Auction Group for fraud and negligence in the
sale of the condominium. The Auction Group moved to compel arbitration via an arbitration agreement
signed by condominium owner’s association. The homeowner was not a signatory to that agreement and
the court held the homeowner could not be bound by it.
232
McDonald v. H & S Homes, LLC and Olympia, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1011805, January
10, 2003.
Manufactured home buyer sued manufactured home seller and its general manager for
misrepresentation, negligence and conversion. The language of the retail installment contract signed at
time of sale required arbitration, and that arbitrator(s) be selected by the assignee of retail installment
contract with consent of buyer. The trial court ordered arbitration, but also ordered the arbitrator(s) be
selected jointly by buyer and seller using the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The
Supreme Court held that arbitration was proper, but the trial court’s order as to the manner in which the
selection of arbitrator(s) took place was inconsistent with terms of the arbitration agreement. The case
was remanded with instructions.
233
Waverlee Homes v. McMichael, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010966, February 14, 2003.
Mobile home buyers signed arbitration agreement with mobile home seller. Mobile home buyers
brought action against seller for fraud. Trial court ordered the case to arbitration, and the arbitrator
entered an award in favor of buyers. The trial court entered the arbitrator’s award as the judgment in the
case and denied seller’s motion to set aside the award on ground of bias of the arbitrator. There was
evidence that the arbitrator had been co-counsel with buyer’s attorney on a prior case and had made
similar rulings in favor of the clients of the former co-counsel in other cases. The Supreme Court held
this evidence was sufficient to support an inference of bias and that the trial court should have used
reasonable impression of partiality standard on review of the award. The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded with directions.
234
Cavalier Manufacturing v. Clarke, et. al., Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1011012, 1011014,
1011106, April 25, 2003.
Mobile home buyers brought actions against dealers and manufacturer in negligence, intentional
misrepresentation and breach of warranty. The parties were ordered by the circuit court to arbitrate and
the dealers and manufacturer appealed contending the trial court ordered arbitration under the wrong
agreement. In essence, the defendants sought to have the arbitration conducted under the contract which
contained more limited damages than the other contracts. In a per curium decision, the Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order as to all but one defendant, and directed the trial court to
order arbitration with that defendant under the contract applicable to it. In affirming the trial court, the
Alabama Supreme Court held that when defendants prepare and execute multiple contracts with a
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Occasionally, the Alabama Supreme Court remanded cases back to a
circuit court to determine whether there was an agreement to arbitrate.235
The Supreme Court of Alabama occasionally used the separability doctrine
to decide a case, and compelled the parties to arbitrate because an allegation
of fraud in the inducement was not against the arbitration agreement, but
against the contract as a whole.236 The Alabama Supreme Court held that
intentional torts fall outside the commerce clause in Ex Parte Webb237 and
should not be ordered to arbitration. The Alabama court revisited Terminix

consumer and those contracts contain ambiguities, the ambiguities will be construed against the
defendants. In this case, all of the contracts contained arbitration clauses, but some were more favorable
to the defendants.
235
Mountain Heating and Cooling v. Van Tassel-Proctor Inc., Supreme Court of Alabama Case No.
1011835, May 2, 2003.
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed and remanded this case to the circuit court to determine
whether language in the contract between a subcontractor and contractor formed an agreement to
arbitrate. The arbitration clause stated the parties agreed to “settle” their disputes through arbitration.
The Alabama Supreme Court held that the words “settle” and “arbitrate” are contradictory terms, and the
case was remanded to the circuit court for a jury trial on whether the parties intended to arbitrate. The
court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court in Mountain Heating and Cooling v. Van Tassel-Proctor,
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals case No. 201 0333, June 14, 2002, and held that “settled by arbitration”
was an agreement to arbitrate. Justice Yates dissent in that opinion formed the basis of the per curium
opinion in the Alabama Supreme Court case. Justice See dissented with the per curium opinion pointing
out that the word “settle” instead of the word “resolve” should not render the arbitration agreement
ambiguous, because the word “settle” does not create doubt as to the parties’ intentions.
236
Johnson Mobile Homes v. Hathcock, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1992310, February 21, 2003.
This mobile home fraud, negligence and bad faith case was filed in a circuit court which denied the
seller’s motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court of Alabama found no allegation of fraud
against the arbitration clause, but an allegation of fraud in the procurement of the container contract. The
seller was within its rights to compel arbitration against the buyer who signed the arbitration agreement.
The co-purchaser who did not sign the arbitration agreement was not compelled to arbitrate. Fraud in the
inducement of the container contract is arbitrable.
237
Ex Parte Webb, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No 1000651, February 21, 2003
The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial courts grant of arbitration for this intentional tort
case, holding that intentional torts are not contemplated within the Commerce Clause. Justice See
dissented based upon the intentional tort at issue arising from an employment situation covered by an
employment agreement containing an arbitration clause. This case would probably be reversed under
current law due to Citizens Bank v. ALAFABCO 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003).
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in Orkin Exterminating Co. Inc. v. Larkin238 but held that the arbitration
agreement did not cover claims that pre-existed the agreement. The Alabama
Supreme Court also held that tort claims falling outside the contract
agreement are not arbitrable.239
One of the more interesting issues dealt with by the Alabama Supreme
Court was reported in Cook’s Pest Control v. Rebar.240 The homeowners in

238

Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc. v. Larkin, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1012181, March 7, 2003.
The facts in this case are remarkably similar to the facts in Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson 513
U.S. 265 (1995), except that in Terminex the controversy arose after the agreement was in effect, and in
this case the controversy arose before the termite agreement was in effect. The Alabama Supreme Court
held that contract principles governed, and pre-dispute arbitration agreements could not govern matters
arising before the pre-dispute arbitration agreement became effective. The controversy centered around a
wood inspection report by Orkin that was prepared prior to the Larkin’s assuming an existing termite
agreement. In Terminex, the problem arose after Dobson assumed the termite agreement with Terminex.
This case is questionable law due to its interpretation of pre-contract related issues as separate
transactions.
239
Lee L. Saad Construction Company, Inc. v. DPF Architects, P.C., Court of Alabama Case No. 1010505.
Nov. 27, 2002.
Contractor filed action against architects, structural engineers, and electrical engineers, alleging
breach of contract, misrepresentation, negligence, and intentional interference with a contractual
relationship. Circuit Court, granted summary judgment for defendants. The Supreme Court, held that (1)
contractor’s tort claims were not within scope of submission to arbitration in dispute with project owner
and thus res judicata did not bar contractor from asserting those claims; (2) arbitrator did not actually
decide that defendants were not responsible for wrongful acts that contractor alleged and thus collateral
estoppel did not apply; (3) doctrine of satisfaction of judgment, based on arbitration award, did not bar
claims; and (4) structural engineer’s affidavit addressing merits of claims shifted burden to contractor for
producing evidence in support of its claims.
Tort claims were not within scope of submission to arbitration in dispute, and thus res judicata did
not bar contractor from asserting those claims in subsequent action. Arbitration clause was
unambiguously limited to matters concerning interpretation of contract of breach of contract.
240
Cook’s Pest Control, Inc. v. Rebar, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No.
1010897, Dec. 13, 2002.
Home owners brought action against pest control for company’s alleged failure to treat and control
termite infestation and repair damage. Company brought motion to compel arbitration, and the Circuit
Court, denied the motion. The Supreme Court, held that: (1) home owners were not attempting
unilaterally to modify an existing contract when they submitted addendum along with contract renewal
fee which eliminated company’s right to arbitrate disputes; (2) company’s continued service and
treatment and acceptance of renewal fee constituted an acceptance of the addendum; and (3) agency
principles did not preclude company’s adoption of the addendum.
Affirmed.
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that case sent an envelope stuffer to the pest control company containing an
addendum, which allegedly relieved them from a duty to arbitrate their
claims under the contract. The trial court upheld the validity of the
homeowner’s addendum and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed.241 The
Alabama court reasoned that if businesses can impose a duty to arbitrate
through a unilateral change in terms, a customer should be allowed to
modify the contract in the same way.
Although the Alabama court continued to rule on exceptional cases
such as the ones cited in the previous paragraphs on a case-by-case basis, the
Sisters five prong hurdle test was utilized to decide cases involving regular
in-state contracts containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause.242 The Sisters

Pest control company’s continued service was an acceptance of modifications to that agreement
which home owners’ proposed through addendum which differed materially from those proposed by
company in its renewal offer. Company did not make counter-offer to the proposed addendum.
241
Id.
242
For cases affirming the FAA’s mandate to arbitrate and passing the Sisters five prong hurdle test see the
following:
Health Insurance Corporation of Alabama v. Smith, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010570, April
11, 2003.
Reversing the trial court’s denial of motion to compel arbitration of a fraud action based on
insurance policies, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the sale of insurance policies substantially
affects interstate commerce. The court held that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in an insurance
policy is enforceable under the FAA even thought the policy holders purchased the policies from an instate insurance agency. The policies were issued in Washington and mailed to the Alabama policyholders. This opinion by Justice See marked a departure for the Alabama Supreme Court from the
analysis previously used in Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Company 775 So. 2d 759
(2000).
McGuffey Health and Rehabilitation Center v. Gibson and Jackson, Alabama Supreme Court Case
1020289, May 9, 2003.
Justice Houston’s majority opinion continued the current Alabama Supreme Court’s departure from
the Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Company, 775 So. 2d 759 (2000) tests relied upon in
2000, 2001 and 2002 opinions by the Alabama Supreme Court. This medical malpractice case against a
nursing home reached the Alabama Supreme Court via a denial by the circuit court of a motion to compel
arbitration. In reversing the trial court, the Alabama Supreme Court held that Medicare funds moving
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test continued until the summer of 2003, when the U.S. Supreme Court dealt
with the Sisters test in Citizens Bank v. Alafabco.243 The U.S. Supreme Court
called Alabama’s attempt to limit the effect of the words “in commerce” in

across state lines to pay for the plaintiffs care must be considered in establishing a necessary nexus to
interstate commerce. Therefore, the admissions arrangement had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. The court also opined that in addition to the admissions agreement the equipment and
supplies used to treat the plaintiffs moved across state lines.
Huntsville Utilities et al v. Consolidated Construction Company, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No.
1020195, May 23, 2003
General contractor brought action against corporation, two of its employees, and its architect,
alleging negligence, breach of warranty, fraud, violation of Prompt Pay Act, and other claims. Circuit
Court denied corporations and its employee’s motion to compel arbitration. The Supreme Court held
that: (1) renovation transaction from which dispute arose had to have a substantial impact on interstate
commerce in order to trigger Federal Arbitration Act (FAA); (2) renovation did not substantially impact
interstate commerce, and thus trial court could not compel arbitration pursuant to FAA; and (3)
corporation’s acquisition of out-of-state materials for renovation, as opposed to contractor’s acquisition
of such materials, was relevant to determining what portion of contract price was allocable to interstate
versus intrastate commerce, for purposes of determining whether renovation triggered FAA.
Bowen v. Security Pest ControlL, Inc. Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010783, Feb. 28, 2003
Homeowners sued termite extermination contractor, asserting numerous claims. Contractor filed
motion to compel arbitration. Circuit Court granted contractor’s motion. The Supreme Court held that
contractor failed to establish that transaction substantially affected interstate commerce, as was required
to enforce written arbitration agreement under Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
Reversed and remanded. This case used the Sisters test.
Bowen v. Security Pest Control, Supreme Court of Alabama Case No. 1010783, February 28, 2003
This case upheld the five-prong Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Company test. See
775 So. 2d 759 (Ala 2000). Justice See dissented and his dissent closely tracked the reasoning of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Citizens Bank v. Alafabco 539 U.S. 52, 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003), which overruled
Sisters five-prong test. The facts of Bowen v. Security Pest Control were similar to the facts in AlliedBruce Terminex v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (195), in which the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Alabama
Supreme Court’s denial of arbitration based on Ala. Code 8-1-41(3). This case is no longer good law due
to ALAFABCO’s effect on Sister’s.
Ala. Sup. Ct. Case No. 1010703, August 30, 2002. This case held that a debt restructuring agreement
failed to meet the test of Sisters and was not a transaction that affected interstate commerce. The reversal
of this case by the U.S. Supreme Court put an end to the Sisters test.
243
Citizens Bank v. ALAFABCO, 539 U.S. 52, 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003). The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated
its opinion in Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995), that the terms “involving
commerce” in the FAA are the functional equivalent of “affecting commerce” under the Commerce
Clause. Therefore, the terms “involving commerce” should be given the broadest reading permissible
under the exercise of the Commerce Clause. This case specifically dealt with the “misguided” reasoning
behind Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran 775 So. 2d 759 (2000), and overruled the Sisters prong test.
The Supreme Court of Alabama in ALAFABCO v. Citizens Bank, Ala. Sup. Ct. Case No. 1010703,
August 30, 2002, had held that a debt restructuring agreement between a builder and a bank did not have
a sufficient relation to a transaction affecting interstate commerce to be governed by the FAA using the
Sisters prong test analysis. The United States Supreme Court reversed holding that the FAA
encompasses a wider range of transactions than those actually “in commerce.” This case overturned
Sisters and its progeny and limited the application of ALA. Code 8-1-41(3) dramatically.
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Sisters was “misguided.”244 The Sisters test and Alabama’s two streams of
cases were effectively “killed” by Citizens Bank v. Alafabco.245 It remains to
be seen if the Alabama judiciary will concede that Ala. Code Section 8-141(3) is a dead statute, or if some other creative attempt will be made to
revive it in another form.
The costs to specifically perform in arbitration have long been debated
by business lawyers and plaintiff’s counsel.246 A 2000 Alabama case that
went to the U.S. Supreme Court almost addressed that issue. Green Tree
Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph247 side-stepped the direct issue of
costs for the consumer in arbitration, but addressed it indirectly by holding
the court would have considered the issue had the consumer attached proof
that the costs of arbitration would have kept her from pursuing her truth in
lending claims in the arbitration forum. This case led to a new procedure for

244

Id.
Id.
246
J. Clark Kelso, Thomas J. Stipanowich, Protecting Consumers In Arbitration, DISPUTE
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There are three great justifications by business for arbitration, to wit: It saves on enormous litigation
expenses, it virtually eliminates runaway verdicts and punitive damage awards and it unburdens the court
system. For business interests arbitration is predictable, controllable and less costly, but is it just another
form of tort reform? Is it impartial between business and consumers? Is the cost allocation in arbitration
between consumers and business fair? Can lawyers who represent business in their practice serve as fair
and impartial arbitrators?
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Green Tree Financial Corp-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). The court decided the case based
upon whether a party’s claims being ordered to arbitration accompanied by a dismissal of the court action
regarding those claims is a final decision under the Federal Arbitration Act. The court held that such was
the case. The court also touched upon whether the silence of the arbitration agreement regarding costs of
arbitration made the agreement to arbitrate unenforceable. The court held that silence regarding costs
and fees did not make the agreement unenforceable. There was no proof in the record of the amount of
the costs and fees and the court declined to rule on prohibitive costs without proof.
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attorneys challenging the costs of arbitration. Attorneys began attaching
affidavits regarding the costs of arbitration to their complaints in Alabama,
in an effort to prove that arbitration was a cost-prohibitive forum.248 The
costs of performance in consumer arbitration continues to be a “core
defense” with consumer groups and plaintiff’s attorneys.249
WHY IS SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE UNDER THE FAA RESISTED BY
CONSUMER GROUPS AND PROMOTED BY BUSINESS INTERESTS?
The answer may be that consumer groups perceive any advantage for
business as a disadvantage for consumers.250 This view does not
acknowledge the benefits of arbitration for the consumer, such as reduced
expenses, time savings, speedy payment of awards and lower attorney fees.
The answer to the controversy may lie in the perspectives of consumer
groups and plaintiffs’ lawyers regarding arbitration. Their view is radically
different from the view of those in the business community.251 The business
community does not view arbitration as a means to cheat customers. For
businesses, arbitration is a process that allows less risk at less cost than
litigation. The consumer is a non-issue in the business perspective on
arbitration.
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A television commercial for a brand of treated lumber bearing a yellow
tag may be analogous to some of the questions currently being raised about
consumer arbitration.252 The commercial begins with the representative of
the lumber company pitching his company’s new slogan by giving away
yellow T-shirts containing the words, “yellow fever – catch it!”253 The
lumber person is perplexed because no one wants the T-shirts, and he asks a
famous football player who also appears in the commercial, “why are the Tshirts not being well received?” The football player responds, “It’s a disease,
Jimmy!”254
Arbitration is viewed by the business community as a process which
allows a jury trial to be avoided and replaced by specific performance under
an agreement to arbitrate. The business community’s perspective on the
avoidance of a jury trial is that it is a good thing.255 The business community
views arbitration as a method to escape the cost of litigation. The business
perspective appears to be at odds with the perspectives of consumer groups
and plaintiffs’ lawyers who believe that escaping litigation is a very bad
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John Wilkinson, Streamlining Arbitration of the Complex Case, DISPUTE RESOLUTION JOURNAL,
August/October 2000 Businesses realize arbitration is faster and more efficient than litigation. It tends to
produce fair and impartial results.
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thing.256 The business leaders view arbitration as a process which can be
utilized to avoid potential financial disaster, while consumer groups and
plaintiffs’ lawyers view consumer arbitration as a process which can be used
by the business community to avoid responsibility. In other words, the
arbitration process is the equivalent of a “disease” to consumer advocates.257
These two divergent views of consumer arbitration appear to be incapable of
reconciliation. Consumer advocates and those in the business community
appear unlikely to acknowledge the merits of each other’s perspectives
regarding arbitration.258
In most jurisdictions there has been little effort to negotiate a middle
ground between the consumer and business views regarding arbitration.
Consumer arbitration has become a battleground where each side has
asserted a “winner take all” position.259 Federal court and state court views
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A. Brooke Overby, An Institutional Analysis of Consumer Law, 34 VAND. J. TRANNA’TL L. 1219
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The methods and mechanisms available to resolve consumer disputes varies greatly from state to
state. Attitudes regarding these processes and their enforceability also differ from one jurisdiction to the
next. The U.S. and the European Union use arbitration to resolve consumer disputes, but in the U.S.
arbitration has become a hotly contested area in contract law and federalism. The U.S. federal courts
have rejected the contemplation of the parties test to determine assent to waive the constitutional right to
access to the judicial system. The general contract law principles have also been limited by federal
decisions in favor of arbitration. There is hostility toward arbitration and denial of access to the courts,
but it appears the access to justice issues involved may be subject to attitudes regarding social policy and
contract law policy. Federalism and consumer values become intertwined in the access to justice issues
involved with binding arbitration.
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Professor Sternlight questioned the legal reasoning behind the Hill v. Gateway decision from the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Placing a binding arbitration clause in shipping documents inside a
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also conflict on this issue. State court judges, who are elected, seem more
receptive to limitations being placed ordering specific performance of predispute arbitration agreements in consumer cases. Federal judges, who are
appointed, are more inclined to expand the use of consumer arbitration in
accordance with the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinions. As a result of these
diametrically opposed positions on consumer arbitration, it has become one
of the most hotly contested areas of law. The focus of the battle appears to
be the solidified positions of the parties, rather than their true interests.260
Consumer arbitration can be distinguished from other types of
arbitration due to the disparity of skill levels between the major
participants.261 In labor arbitration powerful unions are pitted against
business representatives and in commercial business arbitration sophisticated
business representatives are pitted against each other.262 However, in
consumer arbitration, sophisticated business owners are arbitrating against

product box, and requiring the consumer to read it and return the product or be bound by the arbitration
agreement seems to call into question the basic principle of contract law. The transaction for the sale of
the product did not include an arbitration agreement. The agreement was added at the time of delivery.
260
Jeremy Senderowicy, Consumer Arbitration and Freedom of Contract: A proposal to facilitate
consumers’ informed consent to arbitration clauses in form contracts, 32 COLUMN. J.L. & SOC.
PROBO. 275, 277, 286 (1999).
Adhesion contracts are a common feature of service contracts, and most adhesion contracts are
drafted by companies who are familiar with the advantages of arbitration. Repeat players likely
disadvantage the consumers by writing out undesirable elements such as primitive damages, and writing
in waiver of procedural safe guards. Forum selection in these contracts also poses a major hurdle for the
unwary consumer.
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normally less sophisticated consumers.263 The businesses are armed with
“take it or leave it” contracts of adhesion, while the consumers are armed
with “yes” or “no.”264 The consumer can either accept the arbitration
agreements as written or shop elsewhere for products or services.265 The
underlying interests of selling products and purchasing products gets lost in
a power struggle over terms and conditions of dispute resolution before a
dispute ever arises.
Changes occur often in this field of law as a result of the everincreasing body of case law. Some of the lower court cases appear to create
new issues, while most of the U.S. Supreme court cases settle old ones.266
There appears to be no end in sight for the final resolution of this high stakes
controversy. The business interests allege millions of dollars are at stake,
and consumer groups contend basic guaranteed rights are at risk.267 In the
middle of the fray are contract law and equity, which may be forever altered
by the far-reaching principles set forth in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
263
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interpretations of contract law and specific performance as applicable to predispute arbitration clauses under the FAA.
CAN THE MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE SURVIVE? REALITY v.
THEORY:
How well does the reality of specific performance of binding predispute arbitration agreements measure up to the theory of arbitration? In
order to answer that question with any degree of accuracy one must not only
look at the efficiency of the process but also take into account the results
parties obtain when using specific performance to carry out binding
arbitration contracts.268 If arbitration and litigation are really “separate but
equal” forums how do arbitration awards compare to jury verdicts in similar
cases? Why are class actions and punitive damages routinely excluded from
arbitration if the process of arbitration is equal to litigation?269 Given the fact
that litigation is a public process with readily available statistical data
regarding results obtained in trials, and given the fact that arbitration is a
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private process with little available research data, the task of obtaining
reliable data for comparison purposes is next to impossible.
The theory behind the FAA has changed through the years. Although
the FAA started out as procedural, not substantive law, Federal decisions in
this area of the law in the past fifty years have held the FAA is substantive
law applicable to every court in the land.270 Some of these opinions state that
the FAA has always been a substantive law act designed to overcome
judicial hostility, because that was the original intent of Congress.271
However, a review of the hearings held on the Federal Arbitration Act
before its passage make it clear that the drafters of the arbitration act
intended it to be an Article III procedural act applicable only in federal
courts.272 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has brought the original procedural
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Hamilton Life Insurance Company of New York v. Republic National Life Insurance Company 291 F.
Supp. 225 (1968)
The Texas Arbitration Act did not qualify under the McCarran-Ferguson Act as the regulation of
insurance by a state. Therefore, the FAA pre-empts the Texas Arbitration Act. This arbitration principle
remains good law. In order for the McCarran-Ferguson Act to make the FAA inapplicable under the
regulation of insurance by a state, the state statute much specifically govern only insurance and not other
types of contracts in addition to insurance. The statute in this case was a general arbitration act that
governed all contracts and preserved the jurisdiction of state courts over business matters. The case also
held that if fraud is alleged in the formation of the container contract that matter is to be decided by
arbitrators. If fraud is alleged to have formed the basis for the arbitration clause separately from the
container contract, that is a matter for the courts.
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David H. Taylor and Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure By Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private
Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085, 11331145 (2002)
Due to the increasing utilization of pre-litigation agreements the traditional views of contract law
have been turned upside down. Some have charged that judges have allowed their own self-interests in
docket management overcome their concern for the rights of litigants. Forum selection clauses such as
pre-dispute arbitration clauses are an about face for the judiciary. Enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses rests upon judge created interpretations of the FAA. The federal courts have used the FAA and
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nature of the Federal Arbitration Act to the attention of her fellow justices on
the United States Supreme Court on at least two occasions.273 The origin of
the Federal Arbitration Act no longer appears to be an important factor in the
theory analysis utilized by the U.S. Supreme Court in arbitration decisions.
Supreme Court decisions have blurred the line between theory and
reality in arbitration to such an extent that it may no longer be possible to
distinguish between the two. Cases like Citizens Bank v. ALAFABCO274 and
Allied Bruce Terminex v. Dobson275 give rise to the assertion that theory is
reality in cases subject to the Federal Arbitration Act mandates on specific
performance. In other words, a substantive justice theoretically equal to that
achieved in litigation is assumed by compelling specific performance of
arbitration agreements. Binding arbitration will be enforced by federal
courts regardless of any realities associated with unjust outcomes.276
Congress has not acted to repeal or limit the Federal Arbitration Act in

the Commerce Clause to create a body of law that could be described as judicial legislation, and this
favorable body of law has resulted in the proliferation of pre-dispute arbitration agreements. The courts
have refused to revisit the legislative history of the FAA and have become pro-arbitration. The FAA was
a creature of Congress’ Article III authority, but recently has become the enforcer of the Commerce
Clause through judicial slight of hand. The authors urge Congress to take a second look at the current
mess and endeavor to establish some guidelines for enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements
under the FAA.
273
See TERMINEX, Supra FN 116. 513 US. 265 Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion. See also her
dissent in 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
274
Citizens Bank v. ALAFABCO, 539 U.S. 52, 123 S.Ct. 2037 (2003).
275
Allied-Bruce Terminex v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
276
F. Paul Bland, Jr., See FN 268.

78

response to the federal decisions favoring binding arbitration.277 Federal
courts are quick to point out that they must be correctly interpreting the
intent of Congress regarding the scope, application and enforcement of the
Federal Arbitration Act, because Congress has not acted to revise or repeal
the Federal Arbitration Act following these federal decisions.
The Clinton impeachment hearings revealed the United States Congress
is filled with politicians who have a tendency to vote along partisan lines.
There are also groups of politicians who normally cast their votes
consistently with the goals of their constituency. A senator from a
manufacturing state may be more likely to vote for bills favoring the
interests of business than a senator from a predominantly rural state. There
is enough balance in the U.S. Congress between the parties and the interest
groups to allow substantial delays in the passage of legislation that is not
bipartisan in nature. Substantial changes to the Federal Arbitration Act have
been proposed from time to time, but the supporters of these changes were
unable to muster enough support to effect passage of their proposed
legislation. To state that the U.S. Congress could and would pass legislation
277

Richard E. Speidel, Consumer Arbitration of Statutory Claims: Has Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration
Outlived its Welcome?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1069, 1080-1092 (1998)
State statutes which restrict or limit the use of arbitration clauses are preempted by the FAA.
Contract defenses to arbitration clauses are different to prove and are unavailable in most cases. Public
policy defenses do not work due to the favorable status granted to arbitration by the federal courts. The
article urges the FAA be amended to permit judicial review of statutory claims which would require
arbitrators to prepare a written rationale for the award.
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to limit, revise or repeal the Federal Arbitration Act if it were unhappy with
federal court decisions interpreting the FAA mandates is a statement with
little merit, even though it is based on a generally recognized principle of
separation of powers in the three branches of government. It often takes
congress years, if not decades, to address and correct perceived activism by
the federal judiciary.
Binding arbitration agreements are becoming more common in modern
sales contracts between businesses and customers. Specific performance in
consumer arbitration remains a hybrid creature of contract and equity.278 An
obligation to arbitrate arises when the consumer signs a contract with a
business at the time of purchase of goods or services, if that contract
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Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (with a Contractualist Reply to
Carrington and Haagen), McGEORGE LAW REVIEW, 196-219, Winter 1998.
Arbitration law is a part of contract law and is subject to contract law defenses. Much of the law
governing consumers’ freedom to contract is anti-contract law, but the law governing consumer
arbitration is an exception to anti-contract consumer law. The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the
contract law contained in the FAA to the letter amid allegations that is decisions may be result-oriented
and intended to conserve judicial resources. This is a definite shift in the law from pre-FAA days when
arbitration agreements were unenforceable. The question of genuine assent to arbitrate was present prior
to the FAA, and there is much discussion about it in light of recent decisions. The point is made that
people who sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts are less likely to consider what
they are really doing compared to those who sign post-dispute agreements. Professor Ware challenges
the assertion that consumers are not free to contract with regard to contracts of adhesion, because they
are free to walk away and not sign the contract. A case in point which validates Professor Ware’s Theory
can be found in a comparison between automobile dealerships in Alabama and Georgia. In Alabama, the
auto customer is almost always required to sign an arbitration agreement, while customers in adjacent
Georgia are almost never required to sign an arbitration agreement. Therefore, the Alabama consumers
are free to vote with their feet and purchase a car from a Georgia auto dealer rather than sign an
arbitration agreement. Professor Ware points out that contracts require mutual manifestations of assent
and not actual assent. Therefore, the consumer’s actual assent is not required to form a binding contract.
Professor Ware points out that while critics of arbitration complain that the process alienates rights, the
idea behind contracts in general is to create a process where rights can be alienated.
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contains a pre-dispute binding arbitration clause.279 Recent cases have held
that unilateral arbitration agreements such as mailing stuffers inserted with
monthly bills and packing documents inside a product box can also give rise
to a duty to arbitrate.280 However, not all the federal courts presume the
customer read the documents and agreed to arbitrate.281 The marriage of
convenience between law and equity that is binding arbitration appears
healthy and capable of surviving a very long time.
ACCESS TO JUSTICE WAIVERS AND OTHER ISSUES:
The marriage is not without its critics. The question of whether a
party has assented to an arbitration agreement has always been a
controversial issue with regard to pre-dispute arbitration agreements. The
United States Constitution in the Seventh Amendment guarantees every
citizen the right to a trial by jury in matters involving a controversy of over
$25. The right to a trial by jury is not an inalienable right, because like most
statutory and constitutional rights, it can be freely, knowingly and
voluntarily waived. Some scholars have argued that under the restatement of
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Professor Sternlight questioned the legal reasoning behind the Hill v. Gateway decision from the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Placing a binding arbitration clause in shipping documents inside a
product box, and requiring the consumer to read it and return the product or be bound by the arbitration
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contracts, the idea of actual mutual assent to binding arbitration is not
required in order to waive the constitutional right to a jury trial.282 However,
if a constitutional right is to be waived properly, it must be done so by
freely, knowingly and voluntarily waiving the right after a full understanding
of that right.283 It is a stretch to state that a shrink-wrapped arbitration
agreement contained in the middle of other shipping documents could
constitute a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to litigate.284
Perhaps this stretched waiver is the price the federal judiciary is willing to
pay to maintain the benefits of specific performance of arbitration
agreements.
The Magnson Moss Warranty Act prohibits product warranty cases
from being arbitrated.285 It has been the longstanding view of the Federal
Trade Commission that warranty and arbitration are two words which do not
belong in the same sentence.286 However, there have been some federal case
rulings allowing binding arbitration with regard to warranty claims.287
In addition to the statutory battle between the Magnson-Moss Warranty
Act and the FAA, another statutory face-off looms on the horizon. The
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McCarran-Ferguson Act allows the individual states to regulate insurance
within their borders.288 The principle behind McCarran-Ferguson is that
insurance regulation is one of those areas that should be reserved for the
states, and that the federal government should not intervene in the states’
regulation of insurance companies within their borders.289 However, the
federal cases on this issue indicate that the courts will construe the language
of McCarran-Ferguson very narrowly in situations where the complainants
assert McCarran-Ferguson removes the case from the authority of the
Federal Arbitration Act and places it under the authority of the McCarranFerguson Act.290 In the cases decided thus far, the federal courts have
indicated that the states will be allowed to regulate insurance and will be
allowed to rule out arbitration clauses in insurance policies, but only if the
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Id.
290
American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Harmon 147 F. Supp. 2d 511 (2001)
This was a conspiracy theory case seeking reverse preemption of the FAA. The case failed to
reverse pre-empt the FAA under McCarran Ferguson Act, because the party opposing arbitration failed to
show any specific state statute regulating only insurance that would reverse pre-empt the FAA. Harmon
relied upon the informal policies of state officials rather than a state statute, in his effort to reverse preempt the FAA. The federal court held to reverse pre-empt any federal statute under McCarran-Ferguson,
three things must be shown: the federal statute the party is seeking to reverse pre-empt does not regulate
insurance, a state statute was enacted to regulate insurance and the federal statute operates to invalidate,
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state statutes doing this are specifically designed and worded to cover only
insurance matters, rather than general contract law.291
The essence of the federal decisions in this area thus far have been that
the states will be able to maintain their rights to control insurance business,
so long as those rights do not conflict with existing federal law, and that in
doing so the states have constructed insurance statutes that relate only to
insurance.292 The United States Supreme Court has yet to rule on any of the
cases involving the McCarran-Ferguson Act and the FAA, but it will be
interesting to see if the United States Supreme Court maintains the existing
trend among federal courts to occasionally allow McCarran-Ferguson Act to
trump the Federal Arbitration Act under certain specified circumstances.
Arbitration is a very actively litigated area of law, and as these cases
reach the federal court system and eventually the United States Supreme
Court, attitudes toward binding arbitration within the Judiciary could
certainly shift in a moment of time. It is unlikely that any one case, state or
federal, will resolve once and for all the controversy surrounding specific
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performance of binding consumer arbitration. As Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor stated in her concurring opinion in the case of Allied Bruce
Terminex v. Dobson,293 this controversy was created by Congress and this
controversy will have to be resolved by the United States Congress. The
courts can do little else other than interpret the intent of Congress from the
wording of the FAA.
Justice O’Connor’s astute observation has proven true during the nine
years since the Terminex decision. Various interpretations of the effect of
the FAA on contracts have been rendered across the land, but there appear to
be few “bright line” tests involved in these decisions. The underlying theme
of the federal judiciary in arbitration cases seems to be to compel specific
performance of arbitration agreements whenever possible.
CONCLUSION:
Consumer arbitration has a good side. The cost of this process is much
less than the average jury trial. The process does not tie up valuable court
time or the time and efforts of court personnel. Therefore, it is an efficient
marshalling of resources. In addition to costing less than litigation,
arbitration brings about binding results quicker than litigation. The appellate
process in arbitration is quicker and cheaper than the appellate process in
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litigation. Due to the Federal Arbitration Act and the New York Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, an
arbitration award is enforceable nationwide and in numerous foreign
counties.
Consumer arbitration also has a bad side. The up front costs to
consumers is generally higher than litigation, even though the overall costs
are lower. There are no due process rules in arbitration, and the parties play
by the rules they agree upon in their contract or mutually agree upon prior to
arbitration. The arbitrators may not be independent from the conflict, and
are sometimes experts in the field in which they arbitrate (labor,
construction, etc.). If a party receives a bad result in arbitration, there are
very few grounds for appeal of the award. The separability doctrine allows
an arbitration clause to stand when the contract it is contained in fails, unless
the protesting party can defeat the validity of the arbitration clause separate
from the contract.
Arbitration as a dispute resolution process pre-dates jury trials by
centuries.294 It has provided a procedure for parties to receive a binding
resolution at less costs than the public dispute resolution system. Although
294

William A. Forsyth, History of Trial By Jury Frederick D. Linnad Company, JERSEY CITY (1875).
No one seems to know just when the jury trial originated. In England it seems to have been traced to
the Anglo-Saxon times, but others argue about it was a product of the ancient courts of Teutonic nations.
Although there is some evidence that the Scandinavians may have enjoyed the benefits of the jury trial as
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the process was not enforceable at common law, the FAA married law and
equity by combining specific performance with arbitration and thereby
mandating its enforcement. The future of binding pre-dispute arbitration
seems secure, due to the favorable view of arbitration by the federal
judiciary. Arbitration generally results in lower overall costs to the parties
and reduced attorneys fees. Considering the benefits of arbitration the
attacks leveled against it may seem puzzling to some.
The affordable justice arbitration seems to provide has been questioned
by scholars concerned about arbitration’s effect on consumer rights.295
Access to justice issues are a serious matter, and some scholars have
suggested the U.S. Congress take a closer look at the effect of the FAA in
consumer transactions with a view toward placing some restrictions on the
use of arbitration in consumer cases.296 A possible solution might be to
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Woska points out that business has no inherent right to arbitrate its disputes with consumers. The
U.S. Supreme Court requires consumers to have “compelling” contractual or equitable defenses in order
to set aside the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph the
U.S. Supreme Court placed the burden of proving arbitration costs are rights prohibitive squarely upon
the shoulders of the consumer. In other words, the business does not have to prove the cost of arbitration
compared to litigation is equal or even reasonable, but it is the consumer who must prove arbitration
places them at a disadvantage at law. The Supreme Court in Randolph acknowledged that the consumer
might well be forced to bear unreasonable costs, but she did not prove it. (The Randolph case resulted in
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The U.S. Supreme Court took an about face on arbitration clauses in the early 1980’s, and has
created a liberal policy favoring arbitration applicable in state and federal courts. The pre-emption of
state statute designed to ban or restrict arbitration has been the subject of much controversy. Consumers
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allow the parties to contract for judicial review in consumer cases.297
Certainly, the problems with binding arbitration are not insurmountable.
Courts and Congress have found methods to streamline other areas of the
law in years past, and there is little reason to assume the problems associated
with consumer cases are incapable of resolution.298
It does not appear that the FAA will be repealed anytime soon. The
courts appear to have a vested interest in seeing to it that arbitration
continues, because it eliminates numerous cases from their over crowded
dockets.299 The courts will likely continue to address any major problems

do not create these clauses, but are sometimes forced to pay very high fees to enforce their rights in
arbitration proceedings. The consumer’s best chance of avoiding these arguments appears to be in the
area of unconsicionability. The courts should realize that fundamental fairness is involved when the
goals of consumer laws are blocked by barriers created by adhesive predispute arbitration clauses.
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Due to the increasing utilization of pre-litigation agreements the traditional views of contract law
have been turned upside down. Some have charged that judges have allowed their own self-interests in
docket management overcome their concern for the rights of litigants. Forum selection clauses such as
pre-dispute arbitration clauses are an about face for the judiciary. Enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses rests upon judge created interpretations of the FAA. The federal courts have used the FAA and
the Commerce Clause to create a body of law that could be described as judicial legislation, and this
favorable body of law has resulted in the proliferation of pre-dispute arbitration agreements. The courts
have refused to revisit the legislative history of the FAA and have become pro-arbitration. The FAA was
a creature of Congress’ Article III authority, but recently has become the enforcer of the Commerce
Clause through judicial slight of hand. The authors urge Congress to take a second look at the current
mess and endeavor to establish some guidelines for enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements
under the FAA
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Thomas J. Stipanowich, Resolving Consumer Disputes: Due Process Protocol Protects Consumer
Rights, DISPUTE RESOLUTION JOURNAL, August 1998
Professor Stipanowich argues for Consumer Due Process Protocol. The principles of the protocol
access to information about the information about the processes, independent and impartial neutrals,
reasonable costs, reasonable hearing locations and proceedings within a reasonable time.
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Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory
Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1040-1047 (1998)
Federal policy favors arbitral dispute resolution in response to overcrowded dockets, but the extent
of favoritism granted to arbitration is a major departure from previous practice and the early
interpretations of the FAA. The individual state no longer have the power to regulate arbitration
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that arise with pre-dispute arbitration agreements, but there is little, if any,
chance of a divorce in the marriage of convenience. Those who like it and
those who don’t like it will likely be living with it for some time to come.
Some scholars have observed that when it comes to binding arbitration
agreements, businesses write the rules in their adhesive contracts, escape the
legal system and control their own destiny in one feld swoop.300 While this
statement has some merit, it must be remembered that the FAA was passed
in response to a litigation system that was costly, hostile to any alternative
forum and unable to resolve disputes quickly and efficiently. Since 1925,
when the FAA was enacted, the legal system has become much more costly,
time-consuming and frustrating to litigants. If arbitrators are allowed to
work with parties and their counsel it is likely that the dispute can be
reasonably resolved by arbitration in much less time and with less costs than
in litigation.301

agreements due to the federal policy favoring arbitration. Adhesive contracts of employment containing
arbitration clauses are being used to determine employee statutory rights. The logic behind the federal
courts interpretation of the FAA rests on two assumptions: Arbitration is different but not inferior to
courts, and that parties should be allowed to judge their own best interest. In Allied Bruce Terminex v.
Dobson, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the arguments of 20 state attorney’s general against extending
the reach of the FAA. In Doctors Associates v. Casarotto the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Mortano’s
requirement that the notice of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in a contract be in bold letters. States
are not allowed to police the fairness of an arbitration agreement due to preemption by the FAA.
300
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Many of the defenses asserted against arbitration and the criticisms
leveled at this process stem from viewing the legal system as the only place
where “true” dispute resolution can take place.302 Binding Arbitration under
the FAA is not litigation, and attempts to “legalize” it will fail because it is a
hybrid creature of law and equity. The process began as an adjunct to the
system of public dispute resolution in the days of Moses. The process has
been altered and changed through the centuries, but now has come full circle
to its original purpose. It is an alternative forum to the public dispute
resolution forum.
More effort could be made to address the rights’ litigation and access to
justice issues raised by arbitrations opponents, but the arbitration process
appears to serve a viable need as an adjunct to the overburdened legal
system. Parties are free to contract for this process to be whatever they
desire it to be, but under the FAA the parties are not free to agree to arbitrate
and subsequently change their minds. Arbitration is a time efficient and cost
effective method of dispute resolution, and as long as parties freely consent
to its use they should be allowed the benefit of their bargain.
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